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Abstract 
 
 
European countries have experienced massive structural transformation over the past 
twenty-five years with the privatization of state-owned industries, the liberalization of 
markets, and the rise of the European Union.  According to one prominent line of 
analysis, these changes have led to the Americanization of European regulatory styles:  
previously informal and cooperative modes of regulation are becoming adversarial and 
litigation-driven, similar to the American system.  This article explores the 
Americanization hypothesis with a structured comparison of data privacy regulation in 
four countries (France, Britain, Germany, and Italy) and a review of three other policy 
areas.  It finds that European regulatory systems are converging, but not on American-
style litigation, rather on an administrative model of deterrence-oriented regulatory 
enforcement and industry self-regulation.  The explanation for this emerging regulatory 
strategy is to be found in government responses to market liberalization, as well as the 
pressure created by the governance process of the European Union. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
One of the defining characteristics of a nation is its regulatory style.
1  The concept 
of regulatory style refers to the complex legal and political process through which 
government regulators, the public, and the business community interact to make and 
implement public policy.  In the 1970s and 1980s, regulatory styles varied considerably 
among nations:  informal and cooperative in Great Britain, hierarchical and rule-oriented 
in France, and punitive and litigious in the United States, what has been dubbed by 
Robert Kagan as the distinctive American style of “adversarial legalism.”
2  Today, 
however, with the privatization and liberalization of European markets, the spread of 
New Public Management regulatory tools, and the rise of the European Union, a number 
of scholars argue that Europe is coming to resemble America.  In other words, the 
distinctively American system of transparent and adversarial administrative proceedings, 
                                                 
1 Professor, George Washington University Law School.  I would like to thank Maria Teresa Annecca, Sue 
Chen, Claudia Haupt, Dana Jenztsch, Florence Kramer, Clea LeThuc, Karen Linhart, Elizabeth Morrow, 
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for European Studies at Harvard University for their suggestions on different versions of this project.  I am 
grateful to Robert Keohane for his comments on the project at its early stages and to the German Marshall 
Fund for providing the financial support for my fieldwork. 
2 See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 3 (2001); DAVID VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF 
REGULATION 269-70 (1986); Jack Hayward, Mobilising Private Interests in the Service of Public 
Ambitions, in POLICY STYLES IN WESTERN EUROPE 114 (Jeremy Richardson ed., 1982). 3 
 
punitive administrative enforcement and, most importantly, pervasive regulatory 
litigation is being copied in Britain, France, Germany, and the rest of Europe.
3   
 
This article seeks to assess the Americanization claim and to contribute to our 
understanding of the nature and the origins of regulatory change in Europe.   It does so 
with empirical data from a structured comparison of one policy area—data privacy—in 
four European countries (France, Britain, Germany, and Italy) and with supporting 
evidence from three other policy areas.   The main finding is that European regulatory 
styles are converging, but not on a system of adversarial legalism, as expected in the  
Americanization literature, rather on a regulatory process that combines tough, legalistic 
administrative enforcement of government rules with extensive public pressure on 
industry actors to self-regulate.    
 
To understand the causes of this pattern of convergence, I draw on but also 
significantly rework the theory of one of the main proponents of Americanization,  
Daniel Kelemen.
4  Kelemen points to market liberalization and the federalization of 
political power (generally known as Europeanization) as the main causes of change and, 
indeed, I find that both forces have put pressure on national policymakers to alter their 
traditional approaches to privacy regulation.   However, the type of convergence that I 
identify is largely unanticipated by Americanization theory and this is so because the 
theory both fails to adequately unpack the concept of regulatory style and gives only a 
partial account of the process of Europeanization.  A regulatory style has three 
dimensions—the institutions charged with policy implementation, the administrative 
procedures used by bureaucrats, and the regulatory instruments used to accomplish public 
purposes.  The institutional dimension—whether administrative agencies alone, as in 
Europe, or courts and administrative agencies together, as in the United States, are 
entrusted with implementation—has proven to be far more resistant to change than the 
other two because of the highly path-dependent nature of national courts and legal 
doctrine.  Therefore, although the European Commission has succeeded in pushing 
national administrative agencies to adopt a more legalistic approach to regulatory 
enforcement, it has not been able to enlist national courts in the regulatory process.  
Furthermore, Kelemen’s account of Europeanization focuses exclusively on the vertical 
pressure exerted by EU institutions on national governments.  Yet, as my analysis shows, 
Europeanization also facilitates horizontal policy diffusion among member states.  
Through this diffusion process, self-regulation, which was once only popular in 
traditionally cooperative and flexible regulatory systems like Britain and Germany, has 
taken hold in countries like France and Italy with a reputation for being hostile to 
industry participation in policymaking.   
 
The rest of this article proceeds as follows.  The first part explains the concept of 
national regulatory styles, reviews the theory of Americanization of European regulatory 
styles, and develops an alternative approach based on the findings presented in the 
empirical sections of the article.  The second part explains the rationale for my selection 
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of the policy case and the country cases and reviews the empirical methods that I used in 
the study.    
 
The third part analyzes privacy regulation in those countries with early data 
privacy laws—France, Germany, and Britain—and exposes their distinctive regulatory 
styles.   Data privacy was first regulated by European countries in the 1970s, in response 
to the development of new computer technologies and the vast quantities of personal data 
that suddenly became available to governments and corporate actors.  I show that these 
early privacy systems displayed the distinctive attributes of their overarching national 
regulatory styles that have been identified in the comparative public policy literature.  
The British system was the most informal and cooperative, relying heavily on self-
regulation and informal dispute settlement, the French one was the most hierarchical, 
with significant licensing and rulemaking powers exercised by government regulators,  
and the German one stood close to the British one.  In none of these systems, in contrast 
with the American regulatory style, was litigation a significant force.   
 
 In the fourth part, I examine how the two major transformations that have 
occurred since the 1970s—the digital revolution and the Europeanization of privacy 
policy—have put pressure on national policymakers to alter their traditional approaches 
to privacy regulation.  The digital revolution and the resulting proliferation of market 
actors covered by privacy regulation have forced regulators to cut back on flexible but 
resource-intensive licensing and registration.  This same proliferation of market actors 
has made deterrence-oriented regulatory enforcement and self-regulation attractive to 
overwhelmed government bureaucrats.  But even though these regulatory strategies might 
be appealing, their adoption across a widely disparate set of national contexts has been 
driven by Europeanization.  With the EU Privacy Directive, passed in 1995, southern 
countries have come to rely on self-regulatory techniques championed by northern 
countries and administrative agencies everywhere have come under pressure to pursue a 
legalistic approach to enforcement.    
 
The fifth part examines contemporary national systems, which, with the passage 
of the first Italian privacy legislation in 1996, also include Italy.  It unpacks the political 
and legal process through which national systems have converged on a dual strategy of 
self-regulation and legalistic administrative enforcement and demonstrates that litigation 
remains an insignificant component of the regulatory scheme in all countries.  In the sixth 
part, I review developments in anti-discrimination law, environmental policy, and 
consumer protection, to suggest that this pattern of regulatory change marks not only the 
privacy arena but also a wide range of other European policy areas.  The conclusion 
summarizes the main points of the study and explores the implications for comparative 
law research on convergence and legal transplants.   
II.  Theoretical Framework 
  
How public policy gets implemented in democratic societies turns on a number of 
interrelated factors.   Comparative research from the 1970s and the 1980s focused on 
variations on three important dimensions of the regulatory process:  institutions, 5 
 
procedures, and instruments.   European countries and the United States were found to 
differ on each of these dimensions.
5  The institutions charged with implementation could 
be almost exclusively state bureaucracies, as in Europe, or could be courts and 
bureaucracies, as in the United States.   The administrative procedures used by 
bureaucrats to formulate policy could be informal and opaque, as in Europe, or law-
governed and transparent as in the United States.  And the regulatory instruments used to 
implement policy goals could be open-ended, flexible, and managerial as in most of 
Europe, or precise, rigid, and punitive as in the United States.   Taken together, these 
features of the American process—what Robert Kagan calls “adversarial legalism”—
meant that regulators had little policymaking discretion and were embedded in an 
adversarial set of relations with the business community and the public.  By contrast, in 
Europe, bureaucrats had great policymaking freedom and relations between 
administration and industry were cooperative and consensual.   
 
Notwithstanding the marked contrast between Europe and the United States, 
variations also existed within Europe.
 6  First, in some systems (Britain, Germany, the 
Netherlands) the administrative process was fairly open to organized interests, involving 
informal consultation and official committees of interest group representatives, while in 
other countries (France) policy was determined by bureaucratic elites operating in 
relative freedom from organized interests.  Second, this openness to organized interests in 
Britain, Germany, and elsewhere corresponded with a greater reliance on self-regulatory 
instruments—the allocation of authority to industry groups to elaborate and enforce 
standards of corporate conduct.  Third, regulatory standards were especially flexible in 
Britain and more precise and legally binding in continental European systems.  The chart 
below summarizes these transatlantic and European differences in regulatory styles.   
 
  United States  European Systems 
Institutions  Courts and bureaucracy  Bureaucracy 
Administrative 
Procedure  Transparent and formal 
Informal consultation 
and official interest 
group committees 
Closed to 
interest 
groups 
Policy 
Instruments 
Detailed rules and deterrence-
oriented enforcement 
Vague standards and 
self-regulation 
Binding legal 
standards and 
little self-
regulation 
 
 
Today, however, scholars argue that European systems are converging on a 
regulatory process that closely resembles the American one:  litigation-driven, 
                                                 
5 See Robert A. Kagan, Should Europe Worry About Adversarial Legalism?, 17 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 
165 (1997). 
6 See DAVID VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION  269-70 (1986); POLICY STYLES IN WESTERN 
EUROPE 18, 169, 114 (Jeremy Richardson ed., 1982). 6 
 
transparent, and legalistic.
7  Daniel Kelemen, one of the main proponents of this view, 
identifies two major causal factors that are pushing European policy styles towards this 
Americanized model, one having to do with the organization of markets and the other 
related to the governance structure of the European Union.  According to his theory, the 
liberalization and re-regulation of markets that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s has given 
rise to detailed rules, by-the-book enforcement, transparent agency procedures, and active 
courts, inevitably drawn in to police all of these law-bound interactions.  Kelemen also 
argues that adversarial legalism is being driven by the extreme fragmentation of 
government authority in the European Union, where legislative power is exercised at the 
center but executive power rests with the member states.  This argument draws on 
rational choice accounts of policymaking in political science and turns on the difficulty of 
enforcing policy bargains in a universe of divided executive and legislative power.
8  In 
this line of analysis, credible commitments—detailed rules, litigation rights, independent 
courts and regulatory agencies, and sanctions—are the answer to the bargain-enforcement 
problem.  According to Kelemen, these credible commitments are being written into EU 
law and are empowering courts and litigants in the domestic regulatory process.   
 
  This model is a useful starting point for understanding regulatory convergence in 
Europe.  As I demonstrate in the empirical section, both the re-organization of markets 
and the logic of credible commitments have driven convergence in my cases.  The 
proliferation of market actors has pushed data privacy regulators away from flexible, but 
resource-intensive, policy instruments like case-by-case licensing and towards a greater 
emphasis on punishing for rule violations.  In a wide array of policy areas, the European 
Commission has insisted that domestic regulators be given tough enforcement powers 
and independence from their governments to ensure that EU policy bargains will be 
faithfully executed at the member-state level.  However, in important respects, the type of 
convergence that I find departs from the adversarial legalism hypothesis.  At least in the 
privacy field, there has been little pressure to change administrative procedure.  Contrary 
to the rigid, precise form of regulation anticipated by the Americanization hypothesis, 
self-regulation is on the rise across a broad spectrum of policy areas.  Furthermore, 
litigation has not emerged as a significant component of the regulatory process.  The 
chart below summarizes the differences between the convergence anticipated by 
Americanization theory and the findings from my empirical study. 
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8 See, e.g., GEOFFREY GARRETT, THE POLITICS OF LEGAL INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, 49 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 171 (1995) (European Union),  DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, 
DELEGATING POWERS (1999) (American politics) ; Robert O. Keohane, Institutional Theory and the Realist 
Challenge After the Cold War in NEOREALISM & NEOLIBERALISM  269 (David A. Baldwin ed., 1993) 
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  Hypothesized Regulatory Style  Actual Regulatory Style 
Institutions  Courts and bureaucracy  Bureaucracy 
Administrative 
Procedure  Transparent and formal 
Informal 
consultation and 
official interest 
group committees 
Closed to interest 
groups 
Policy 
Instruments 
Detailed rules and deterrence-
oriented enforcement 
Deterrence-oriented enforcement and 
self-regulation 
 
The paucity of litigation is one of the biggest problems for Americanization 
theory.  In the privacy case, as well as the other policy areas that I take up at the end of 
the article, there have been various attempts to improve litigant rights, but they have 
consistently been beaten back by skeptical governments and legal scholars.  Moreover, in 
the law-in-action, litigation has not had an impact.  In my study, in no national system do 
privacy regulators report being taken to court more often now than in the past.  
Furthermore, the data set that I constructed on statutory tort cases brought by privacy 
victims between 1980 and 2007 did not show an increase in litigation rates.  Litigation in 
Italy, Germany, and France was low and constant, and damages awards were modest. 
(Indeed in Germany they were never awarded.)  Britain is a partial exception in that 
litigation did rise slightly, but in no way can it be said to be a significant component of 
the regulatory scheme:  the numbers went from virtually no litigation in the 1980s and 
1990s to an average of three to four cases decided per year by the main trial court in the 
2000s.   
 
Neither is the data presented by Kelemen adequate to support the Americanization 
hypothesis.  He offers impressive aggregate-level figures on growth in the number of 
lawyers in Europe, the increasing market value of the legal services industry, and other 
indicators, but he does not have data on trends in litigation rates or damages awards.  
Although it is true that courts can influence markets and regulators through simply the 
risk of litigation, we would still expect evidence of an increased perception of risk.  
Without more, rising numbers of lawyers and growing expenditures on legal services do 
not tell us much about this risk.  In increasingly complex societies, in which more and 
more behavior is governed by legal rules, we would expect both government 
administration and business to rely heavily on legal counsel to understand what is 
required of them under the law.  Whether those lawyers are spending more time than 
before in court, defending their clients in high-stakes litigation, or threatening to take 
others to court is a different matter.  What is needed to convincingly make the case for 
adversarial legalism and what still does not exist are data showing increases in litigation 
rates, damages awards, public reports of punitive damages, and other indicators to 
suggest that fear of the courtroom looms larger than before in both the government and 
corporate worlds.   
 8 
 
How can we explain the failure of litigants and courts to emerge as significant 
players in the European regulatory process?  The answer to this puzzle lies in the path-
dependent nature of courts and the interconnected system of legal rules, judicial 
decisions, academic scholarship, and legal education that constitutes any legal order.
9  To 
use the schema outlined earlier, it is far more difficult to change the institutions involved 
in the policymaking process and to insert courts as equals to bureaucrats, than it is to 
simply convince bureaucrats to switch regulatory tools and punish more.  It is impossible 
to do justice in this brief section to the complex reasons for this pattern of European 
resistance to change, but the key is to be found in the difference between law conceived 
as a free-standing, technical discipline and law understood in legal-realist terms, as a 
malleable instrument designed to accomplish various policy ends.  American tort 
litigation under regulatory statutes, which includes litigation-facilitating devices such as 
class actions, treble damages, and attorneys fees awards, has been fueled by the legal-
realist approach to law:  private litigation between two parties can be legitimately used to 
protect society-at-large and punish for violations of regulatory statutes.
10  Although one 
must beware of generalizing, in European legal systems, by contrast, tort law is 
understood as a set of technically complex rules that determines what type of harm gives 
rise to a legitimate claim for damages.
11  The purpose is to afford a remedy, not 
deterrence, which is believed to be handled best by the police, administrative authorities, 
and the “political” branches of criminal and administrative law.  These drastically 
different American and European understandings of the law are embedded in legal 
doctrine, are perpetuated in legal education, and are repeated and reinforced daily, in the 
interactions of the legal establishment.  No wonder, then, that the numerous attempts of 
the European Commission to make specific regulatory standards actionable under 
national tort law have met with protest from national legal elites who fear the 
contamination of their systems of private law.
12 
     
The other difficulty with the analytical framework put forward by Kelemen is that 
it overlooks a critical source of convergence—policy diffusion.  As defined by Beth 
Simmons, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett, “[i]nternational policy diffusion occurs 
when government policy choices in one country are systematically conditioned by prior 
policy choices made in other countries (sometimes mediated by the behavior of 
international organizations or even private actors or organizations).”
13  Policy diffusion 
has been credited with influencing the timing and geographical scope of economic 
liberalization, the rise of democratic institutions, and the adoption of constitutions.  A 
number of mechanisms are believed to contribute to diffusion:  coercion, competition, 
learning, and emulation.
14  Within the European Union, the diffusion of policy ideas 
among national regulators is particularly intense because of the dense set of transnational 
                                                 
9 See Oona Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2000-2001); PAUL PIERSON, 
POLITICS IN TIME (2004). 
10 Similar reasons are behind European and American differences in administrative law litigation.   
11 See generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (3d ed. 2007).   
12 See Reinhard Zimmerman, Comparative Law and the Europeanization of Private Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 539 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmerman eds., 2006). 
13 Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin & Geoffrey Garrett, Introduction:  The International Diffusion of 
Liberalism, 60 INT’L ORG. 781, 787 (2006).   
14 Id. at 781. 9 
 
policymaking networks that exist in virtually every area of social and economic 
governance.    
 
In the privacy arena, as well as the other policy areas that I review, self-regulation 
has become an increasingly popular technique throughout Europe by virtue of this policy 
diffusion pathway.  I find that privacy regulators from countries like Britain, the 
Netherlands, and Germany, with extensive experience with self-regulation, have 
promoted these instruments in EU networks, and that policymakers from countries like 
France and Italy, without such experiences, have been eager to adopt them.  Moreover, 
regulators in these northern countries have been open to experimentation with new self-
regulatory techniques, which differ in important ways from the older ones but which 
nonetheless still allow for more industry initiative and flexibility than command-and-
control regulation.  And, again, these instruments have migrated to southern countries via 
EU networks.   
  
  This revised and extended analytical framework offers a better understanding than 
Americanization theory of the nature and origins of regulatory convergence in 
contemporary Europe.  It breaks down national regulatory styles into institutions, 
administrative procedures, and regulatory instruments, and shows why the institutional 
dimension of a regulatory style—the greater or lesser involvement of courts in the 
policymaking process—is particularly resistant to change.  In addition, it identifies policy 
diffusion and EU networks as a factor that has contributed to regulatory convergence. 
III.  Case Selection and Methodology   
 
Data privacy was selected as the policy case for exploring changing European 
regulatory styles for two reasons.  First, the independent variables behind the 
Americanization hypothesis are at work in the data privacy field.  Data privacy regulation 
first emerged in the early 1970s, at a time when the differences in regulatory styles 
between America and Europe and among European countries were at their peak.  Since 
then, those economic sectors most affected by privacy regulation have been liberalized:   
banking, financial services, and network industries have all witnessed a shift from public 
to private ownership, increased competition, and a proliferation of market actors.  
Moreover, data privacy policy has been Europeanized.  In 1995, the European Union 
entered the policy arena with the Data Privacy Directive, and, as is typical, allocated the 
executive power of policy implementation to the member states, thus giving rise to the 
need for credible commitments.
15 
 
The other reason for selecting data privacy is that previous comparative research 
on the policy area showed that early national regulatory styles fit with the system-wide, 
ideal type differences described above and therefore any transformations discovered in 
regulatory styles could also be expected to be representative of the broader universe of 
policymaking.  In his 1992 book, Colin Bennett demonstrated that the early substantive 
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goals of American and European (British, Swedish, and German) privacy policy were 
extremely similar, but that the institutions and policy instruments responsible for 
implementation diverged considerably and differed along the lines anticipated in the 
comparative public policy literature.
16   My study adds to his account of early regulatory 
styles by considering the French case and by giving a legal analysis of what goes into a 
national regulatory style.  My main contribution, however, lies in the systematic 
exploration of the fate of these early regulatory styles in the wake of liberalization and 
Europeanization.   
 
In addition to the policy case, I selected a number of country cases.  This study 
seeks to trace the complex interaction between domestic and EU policymaking over time 
and, in doing so, it was unfeasible to include all twenty-seven member states.  I chose to 
focus on France, Britain, Germany, and Italy because they are generally considered core 
states within Europe.
17  They are the largest European countries, as ranked either by their 
populations or their economies.  Moreover, they are all longstanding members of the 
European Union.  To the extent that liberalization and Europeanization have had an 
impact on regulatory styles, we would expect change to be observed in these cases and, 
vice versa, only if we observe change in these cases can a strong claim be made that a 
single European regulatory style is emerging.      
  
  This study relies on a variety of methods and sources to gather evidence on 
regulatory styles.  I examined different types of legal texts:  data privacy laws, 
implementing rules, internal agency regulations, agency decisions, and judicial decisions.  
To understand the rationale for the choice of different types of policy instruments, I drew 
on the official reports leading to the adoption of these laws, interviews with key 
policymakers, and the extensive secondary literature on data privacy in Europe.  
Understanding the day-to-day practice of policymaking and enforcement was more 
complex.  Both qualitative and quantitative data were used:  I conducted over thirty 
interviews with privacy officials and regulated parties and corresponded with them at 
different stages of the project.  National privacy agencies all publish annual reports and 
these served as the source for data on enforcement actions and annual regulatory agendas.  
Last, I collected original data on privacy litigation by running searches in the major 
national electronic databases containing judicial decisions. 
IV.  Early Regulatory Styles 
 
Data privacy emerged as a policy problem at virtually the same moment across 
Western Europe.  The common trigger was the development of computer technologies 
that enabled governments to collect, store, and process vast quantities of data on their 
citizens.  The fear was that the awe-inspiring capacity of these new databanks would be 
                                                 
16 COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY  (1992).  Bennett shows that, in the United States, litigation 
rights were central to the regulatory scheme, while in Germany and Britain, regulators were styled as 
ombudsmen, with only soft powers of persuasion.  In Sweden, a powerful privacy regulator was 
established, with a full complement of licensing and enforcement tools. 
17 Studies on the national dimension of EU policymaking typically include these four cases.  See, e.g., 
THATCHER, supra note 7; VIVIEN A. SCHMIDT, DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE (2006). 11 
 
abused: wrong data could lead to unfair administrative determinations; personal data 
could be used by governments to control and manipulate their populations; rogue public 
officials could consult databanks for their own personal advantage.  Economic actors 
were less of a threat than governments because of the limited availability of information 
technologies but some did have the resources to build large databanks—
telecommunications companies, banks, and other large corporate actors—and they too 
were mistrusted.  By the early 1970s, this commonly perceived threat gave way to a 
constant stream of government-sponsored expert committees and official reports.  
Reports were followed by legislation.  And in the countries selected for this study, 
legislation was enacted in 1977 in Germany, in 1978 in France, and in 1984 in Britain.  
Italy was a laggard, due to general apathy to the policy problem and the instability of 
governing coalitions during the period, and it enacted data privacy legislation only in 
1996, under pressure from the European Union.  For this reason, I postpone all discussion 
of the Italian system until the later section on contemporary regulatory styles.    
 
The core principles contained in these early privacy laws were remarkably 
similar.
18  Consensus emerged on four objectives:  to guarantee oversight of databases, to 
ensure the accuracy of the personal data contained in computing  systems, to protect data 
security, and to place limits on the collection, use, and storage of personal information.  
Through oversight, ordinary individuals would be empowered vis-à-vis the mammoth 
databanks containing their personal data.  Transparency was key to oversight:  the 
existence and the inner workings of all databanks had to be disclosed to the public.  
Access was also important to ensuring oversight:  individuals were given the right to 
request their personal information and, if necessary, to correct or erase that information. 
The accuracy of personal data would protect against unfounded and manifestly unfair 
determinations based on that data.  Security would prevent fraudulent uses of the personal 
data stored in computing systems.  Limitations on collection, use, and storage would deter 
governments and large corporate actors from building databanks capable of violating 
basic liberties and controlling the population. 
 
Notwithstanding these common principles, privacy was embedded in distinct legal 
frameworks.  In Germany, data privacy fell squarely in the domain of constitutional 
law.
19  It was considered a fundamental constitutional right, part of the right to human 
dignity and the right to free development of personality.  The impetus for data privacy 
legislation came largely from legal scholars who insisted that, as a matter of 
constitutional law, the government could not collect personal data without statutory 
privacy guarantees, and policymaking in the area was, and continues to be, conducted in 
the long, powerful shadow of the German Constitutional Court.   
 
The contrast between Germany and Britain could not be starker.  In 1984, when 
Britain enacted legislation, it did not have a tradition of fundamental rights, full stop, and 
                                                 
18 BENNETT, supra note 16 at 95-115. 
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Peter Bull, Datenschutz als Informationsrecht und Gefahrenabwehr, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 
No. 23, June 6, 1979, pp. 1177-1182 , at 1181; Spiros Simitis, Chancen un Gefahren der elektronischen 
Datenverarbeitung, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, No. 16, April 1971, pp. 673-682, at 675. 12 
 
in the private sphere, it lacked a common law right of privacy.
20  The British law was 
adopted in response to external forces—to implement the Council of European 
Convention of 1981.
21  Although the conservative Thatcher government was wary of the 
regulatory burdens that would be created by the new scheme, it had very little choice but 
to sign and implement the Convention.  The fear was that failure to join the Convention 
would give other countries reason to divert data flows away from Britain and therefore 
would undermine the competitiveness of British industry.  In the regulatory practice that 
followed, data privacy was conceived largely as a matter of good corporate practices and 
responsible management of information systems, not as a question of individual rights.  
Indeed, in the 1980s, employees in the responsible administrative agency jokingly 
referred to privacy as the “p-word,” a word that, as a matter of government policy, was 
never to be mentioned.
22 
 
In France, similar to Germany, privacy was considered a fundamental right 
(liberté publique).  But the right to privacy, like most French rights, had a distinct 
republican flavor.
 23  The origins of the French legislation are to be found in the popular 
outrage caused by the revelation of a number of mammoth government databases and the 
legislative drafting work of an elite government committee that was established in the 
wake of the scandal.  In the French scheme, vindication of the right was not left to 
individuals and their lawyers but to public servants—the administrative agency created 
by the law and the criminal prosecutors tasked with pursing violations of the law.  No 
French court had the power to entertain fundamental rights cases brought by individuals, 
not even the constitutional court.  And individuals preferred to obtain redress as civil 
parties to criminal prosecutions rather than by independently bringing tort cases against 
those private firms and state officials that had violated their privacy rights. 
 
The other important source of variation among early privacy systems, and the one 
that lies at the heart of this study, was the type of regulatory system established to 
implement data privacy safeguards.  The subtleties of each country case are fully 
explored below, but let me preview the findings here.  In all three cases, administrative 
agencies independent of the executive branch were created, driven by the logic of the 
policy area:  the main party being regulated was the government and therefore 
enforcement could not be entrusted to an office within a government ministry, but rather 
had to be given to an independent, arms-length body.  Nonetheless, the policy tools and 
administrative procedures employed by these independent agencies varied considerably 
and mapped onto the general patterns outlined earlier.  The British case most closely 
approximated the flexible, cooperative model.  The British privacy regulator served as an 
ombudsman, informally settling complaints brought by privacy victims, managed a 
                                                 
20 This account is drawn from BENNETT, supra note 16 at 82-94; BRYAN NIBLETT, DATA PROTECTION ACT 
1984 1-8 (1984); 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DATA PROTECTION 1020/3-1024 (Rosemary Jay et al., latest update 
August 2009).  
21 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 
Council of Europe Treaties No. 108 (Jan. 1, 1981).   
22 Interview with Data Protection Registrar official, March 5, 2003.   
23 This account is drawn from GUY BRAIBANT, RAPPORT AU PREMIER MINISTRE, DONNÉES PERSONNELLES 
ET SOCIÉTÉ DE L'INFORMATION 31-32 (1998); DAVID FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE 
SOCIETIES 169-73 (1989). 13 
 
registration system for databanks, and promoted industry self-regulation, so-called codes 
of practice.  But it had no rulemaking power and few enforcement powers.  The German 
system was similar to the British one:   Self-regulation was absolutely central, privacy 
regulators served largely as ombudsmen, administrative enforcement powers were light, 
and rulemaking power was retained by the government.  The French system was the most 
formal and hierarchical of the early privacy systems.   There the privacy regulator had 
licensing, registration, and rulemaking powers and routinely used them to set down 
conditions for government and private-sector databanks.  It had considerable 
investigation and sanctioning powers, although it rarely used them.  And in contrast with 
Germany and Britain, self-regulation was absent and complaints mainly served as a 
trigger for agency enforcement, not as part of an informal dispute resolution system.  
Nowhere was litigation—brought to challenge administrative decisions or to enforce 
regulatory duties through tort suits—a significant component of the regulatory system. 
 
a. France 
At the epicenter of the French scheme was an independent, multi-member 
government commission (Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés or 
CNIL) entrusted with extensive licensing, rulemaking, and enforcement powers.
24  The 
French law established a two-track system, one for private actors and another for public 
actors.  Because the public sector was perceived as the main threat to privacy, its 
regulatory duties were the most onerous.  Public databanks required a license (avis 
favorable) from CNIL, with a right of appeal to the Council of State (un décret pris sur 
avis conforme du Conseil d’Etat).  In practice, CNIL rarely granted or denied licenses 
outright, but preferred to set down the conditions under which the proposed data 
processing would be lawful.  To mention but one example, the decision authorizing the 
state telecommunications monopoly’s billing system required that the last four digits of 
the numbers dialed be anonymized.
25  In the 1980s and 1990s, the majority of agency acts 
were decisions on these types of licensing applications—big public databases with 
information on housing, social security, political parties and more.  The details of private 
databanks, by contrast, only had to be notified to CNIL, after which operations could 
commence.  Both public and private databanks were entered into a public register open to 
individuals interested in discovering where their personal information was located and 
how it was being used.  The public register was designed to foster transparency and to 
enable CNIL to keep abreast of trends in computer technologies and privacy threats.   
  
  Related to licensing and notification was the power to issue administrative 
regulations (normes simplifiées) specifying the privacy standards applicable to different 
types of databanks.  These have been issued in areas such as personnel records, customer 
files, and survey data.  An operator that follows the applicable regulation is spared the 
ordinary licensing and notification process and simply is required to file a declaration 
                                                 
24 This overview of the regulatory framework is based on Act 78-17 of 6 January 1978 on Data Processing, 
Data Files and Individual Liberties; JEAN FRAYSSINET, INFORMATIQUE FICHIERS ET LIBERTÉS 76-77 (1992); 
ANDRÉ LUCAS, LE DROIT DE L’INFORMATIQUE 49 (1987).   
25 CNIL, Délibèration No. 82-104 du 6 juillet 1982 portant sur la mise en place d’un traitement automatisé 
de facturation téléphonique detailleé, Annual Report 1982 at 39, 242.  14 
 
stating that it is in compliance.   CNIL has made extensive use of this rulemaking power. 
According to one estimate, by 2002, approximately eighty percent of all data processing 
operations were covered by administrative regulations.
26   
 
Regulatory enforcement powers were substantial, although in practice they were 
used infrequently.  These included the power to enter premises, inspect databanks and 
request documents, all without proof of wrongdoing and without the need to go to the 
courts for authorization.
27  Sanctions consisted in either a non-binding administrative 
warning (avertissement) or referral of the violation to the criminal prosecutor’s office.  
An administrative complaints procedure existed but, in the French system, this procedure 
was conceived not as a form of informal dispute resolution, but as a means of detecting 
possible violations—a trigger for the enforcement system.
28   Despite these considerable 
powers, the record shows that they were rarely used.  In the 1980s and 1990s, inspections 
averaged just 21 per year, warnings 2 to 3 per year, and referrals for prosecution under 1 
per year.   In short, the French privacy agency preferred to set down privacy guarantees 
for databanks through licensing and rulemaking rather than monitor and sanction for rule 
breaches, acting more as policymaker than policeman.         
 
  As for litigation, the background principles of administrative law and tort law 
applied.  Even though, compared to other European systems, the French system is 
generous to plaintiffs, it does not have the punitive damages awards, class actions, and 
other litigation incentives of the American system, and therefore it should not come as a 
surprise that litigation rates were low.
29  There are no official sources on data privacy 
litigation and therefore I constructed a data set based on searches of the two major French 
electronic databases, starting in 1986 for administrative law challenges to CNIL decisions 
and in 1990 for statutory tort cases.  In the 1980s and 1990s, challenges to CNIL 
decisions were sporadic:  in many years, the number of cases decided was 0 or 1 and in 
no year was it higher than 5, for a total of 23 cases decided between 1986 and 1999. 
Statutory tort litigation was also minimal:  a search for data privacy cases decided by the 
highest court (Court of Cassation) between 1990 and 1999 resulted in only 13 cases. 
 
b. Germany 
 
In contrast with France, when Germany adopted federal privacy legislation in 
1977, it avoided a top-heavy licensing and registration system for databanks.  Instead, 
consonant with German administrative tradition, policymakers opted for a system of self-
regulation and negotiated compliance:  internal compliance officers and industry 
association agreements, on the one hand, and informal dispute resolution by 
administrative agencies on the other hand.   
                                                 
26 Interview with member of CNIL, October 19, 2002. 
27 These powers are analogous to American administrative inspections and American administrative 
subpoenas.   
28 See, e.g., Annual Report 1986 at 35-37; Annual Report 1987 at 24-25. 
29 In French administrative law, the rules of standing favor plaintiffs because they do not need to show any 
particular harm in bringing challenges to administrative regulations.  Under French tort law, breach of a 
statutory duty automatically constitutes a tort under the Civil Code, without the need to show other 
evidence of fault.  Moreover damages for emotional distress (dommage moral) are routinely awarded.   15 
 
 
Before proceeding with this discussion of the German regulatory style, a brief 
explanation of the complex bureaucratic organization of privacy regulation is in order.  In 
line with German federalism, the original privacy law split public-sector oversight 
between a federal office with jurisdiction over the federal public sector and state (Land) 
agencies with jurisdiction over their Land public sectors.
30  Private-sector oversight, by 
contrast, was left entirely to the Länder.  Although public-sector agencies were uniformly 
independent of the executive branch, given that the executive branch was the object of 
their oversight activities, private-sector agencies were generally part of the Land Ministry 
of Interior and subject to the ordinary hierarchical system of ministerial control and 
accountability.  Only the small city-states of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lower-Saxony 
decided to consolidate public and private-sector oversight in a single, independent 
authority, more for reasons of administrative expedience than anything else.  For 
purposes of brevity, the following discussion focuses on the legal powers of private-
sector regulators and the analysis of how these powers have been used in practice relies 
mostly on information reported by the Hessian regulator.
31   
 
From the very beginning of the debate on what shape privacy regulation should 
take, self-regulation was emphasized as the key to good data privacy policy.  The 
government’s report on the proposed legislation was peppered with references to the 
principle of “self-responsibility and self-control”  (Prinzip der Selbstverantwortlichkeit 
und Selbskontrolle).
32  Under the law, private firms were required to appoint an internal 
compliance officer who was responsible for keeping a record of the company’s 
databanks, conducting employee training, and ensuring respect for the law.
33  This officer 
had to be an expert in computer technology and was guaranteed absolute independence 
from her employer.  If the internal compliance officer needed advice on how to apply the 
legislation or faced resistance from her employer, she could turn for help to the privacy 
authority.  These self-regulatory duties were strictly enforced:  the reports published by 
the Hessian authority in the 1990s show that agency enforcement proceedings were 
routinely brought against companies that failed to appoint internal compliance officers 
and internal compliance officers that failed to comply with their statutory duties.   
 
Another form of self-regulation was voluntary industry rules.  This was not 
written into the data privacy law, but was and continues to be a common regulatory 
practice.  In Germany, trade associations routinely submit model contracts and industry 
rules to regulators for their advice and informal approval and the data privacy field is no 
exception.
34  One prominent example in the privacy field is the so-called SCHUFA clause 
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annual reporting system and is responsible for policing the financial services industry, typically a source of 
privacy concerns.   
32 BT-Drucksache 7/1027 at 18.     
33 BDSG 1977 §§ 28, 29. 
34 See Steven Casper, The Legal Framework for Corporate Governance: The Influence of Contract Law on 
Company Strategies in GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES IN VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM 387, 396 (Peter 
A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001). 16 
 
included in all contracts entered into between banks and their customers.
 35  All German 
banks are participating members of a central clearing house on creditworthiness called 
SCHUFA (Schutzgemeinschaft für Absatzfinanzierung und Kreditsicherung), through 
which they pool and exchange data on their clients’ credit history.  This kind of data 
transfer must satisfy a number of legal conditions, including the duty to disclose transfers 
of personal information to banking customers and to obtain their consent.  In the mid-
1980s, a standard clause was developed to meet these legal requirements by the industry 
association for banks (Zentraler Kredit Auschuss or ZKA), in close cooperation with 
Hesse and other Land privacy regulators, and then was adopted as a matter of good 
business practice by all the member banks.  Although this process does not result in an 
official administrative decision, both industry players and regulators consider the 
outcome of the process to be binding.  The letter from the privacy agency approving the 
industry rules is treated as a definitive interpretation of the law, guiding agencies and the 
courts in their application of the law and giving firms that adhere to the outcome solid 
assurance of being in line with their legal duties. 
 
The heavy reliance on self-regulation in German data privacy law might seem 
impossibly optimistic.  Yet the German system is widely reputed to be among the best in 
Europe.  To understand why, it is necessary to situate self-regulation in the data privacy 
arena in the larger institutional and economic environment in which it operates.  In a 
coordinated market economy like Germany, economic life is highly organized and 
institutionally rich.
 36  In contrast to liberal market economies like the United States and 
Britain, in which labor, technology, and capital are secured through arms-length, 
competitive market transactions, coordinated market economies like Germany and 
Sweden rely more heavily on coordination among firms and between labor and capital.  
Many public goods like education and vocational training that in a liberal market 
economy are provided by the state or not at all, are produced by economic actors.
37  One 
such public good might be said to be rulemaking and enforcement.  Self-regulation 
entails a considerable degree of discretion and a firm that is part of a highly disciplined 
industry association in a coordinated market economy, risks opprobrium if it uses this 
discretion to tip the balance too far away from the regulatory goal, in the direction of firm 
profits.
38  Similarly, a firm that seeks to get around the discipline of an internal 
compliance officer by dismissing that officer faces all the hurdles of German labor law, 
an important feature of coordinated market economies.
39  In a liberal market economy 
like the United States, these organizational safeguards are generally not in place to 
incentivize firms to set stringent rules or to protect internal compliance officers from 
                                                 
35 Interview with officials from the BVD (Association of Cooperative Banks), BDB (Association of Private 
Banks), and BOB (Association of Public Banks), July 3, 2003. 
36 Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, Introduction, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 387, 396 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001). 
37 See KATHLEEN THELEN, HOW INSTITUTIONS EVOLVE:  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SKILLS IN 
GERMANY, BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN (2004). 
38 See generally John D. Donahue & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Public-Private Collaboration in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY 496, 514-518 (Michael Moran et al. eds., 2006). 
39 For an overview of the German labor law system with a view to the termination decision, see Michael 
Kittner & Thomas C. Kohler, Conditioning Expectation, 21 COMP. LAB. LAW & POL’Y J. 263, 300-320 
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employer pressure.  In other words, in the German context, this type of self-regulation is 
a viable alternative to state enforcement, not necessarily the case in a liberal market 
economy like the United States. 
 
Returning to German privacy authorities, they operated largely as ombudsmen, 
investigating and resolving privacy complaints, not as agenda-setters or policemen 
patrolling for regulatory breaches.  The powers bestowed upon privacy authorities were 
limited.  Their only direct form of rulemaking power was, and continues to be, non-
binding, informal recommendations on good data privacy practices (known variously as 
Orientierungshilfe, Richtlinie, and Empfehlungen).
40  Enforcement was conceived 
entirely as an appendage to the informal settlement of privacy disputes by administrative 
authorities.  Before a privacy agency could take any action, it had to receive an individual 
complaint.
41  These complaints would give rise to an investigation, which generally 
entailed a simple phone call or written notice, but also could escalate to a search of firm 
premises or an administrative subpoena for documents.  If the dispute was not resolved 
informally, an administrative fine proceeding could be commenced for a limited subset of 
violations.  Most regulatory breaches, however, were punished as criminal offenses and, 
unlike France where the privacy agency had the power to make criminal referrals, privacy 
victims themselves had to file a complaint with the prosecutor.
42  The practice of the 
Hessian authority underscores this consensual approach to regulatory enforcement:  in the 
1990s, individual complaints were routinely investigated, but most were settled amicably 
and few administrative proceedings were brought.
43  This emphasis on the routine 
resolution of privacy complaints through informal means distinguished the German 
privacy regulator from the French one and put it close to the British one, which as we 
shall see, operated a similar dispute resolution system. 
 
In the original privacy scheme, litigation was left to the background law of 
regulatory offenses for challenges to administrative fines, and to the background law of 
statutory torts for individual suits against privacy violators.  This changed in 1990, when 
the data privacy legislation was amended to facilitate tort litigation: the amendments 
made it somewhat easier to sue government agencies by allowing victims to recover 
without establishing fault, i.e., negligence or intent, and they made it easier to recover 
against private tortfeasors by shifting the burden of proof on fault to the defendant.
44  Yet 
these changes had no impact on litigation rates, which remained low throughout the 
1980s and the 1990s.
45  A search of the data privacy cases decided by the highest court 
with jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters (Bundesgerichthof) from 1977 to 2007 
resulted in a trickle of one to three cases per year in the 1980s, followed by a dry spell in 
the 1990s, followed by another trickle of cases.  The numbers on litigation before the 
highest labor court were even lower:  between 1990 and 2007, a total of six privacy cases 
                                                 
40 E-mail from Hans Tischler, Office of the Federal Data Protection Commissioner, April 15, 2009. 
41 BDSG 1977 § 29.  
42 Id. § 41. 
43 The Hessian annual reports were available starting in 1990. 
44 BDSG 1977 (as amended in 1990) §§ 7, 8. 
45 Although systematic data on administrative litigation were not available, it appears from the Hessian 
annual reports that firms occasionally challenged the administrative fines issued by the privacy regulator 
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were decided.  Quite remarkably, none of the case reports in the data set, which also 
includes lower courts, mentions a damages award.  In sum, as in France, private litigation 
was an insignificant component of the regulatory process.   
 
c. Britain 
 
   The early British regulatory framework, enacted in 1984, rested on three 
components:  registration, voluntary codes of practice, and administrative dispute 
resolution.
46  At the heart of British privacy regulation was a registration system managed 
by an independent government authority—the Data Protection Registrar.
  With only a few 
exceptions, the details of all public and private databanks had to be filed with the Data 
Protection Registrar and included in a public register, in the interest of improving 
transparency and enabling the privacy regulator to catch emerging privacy problems. The 
choice of an independent agency and a registration system was clearly influenced by the 
trend that had emerged in other European countries, all of which had independent privacy 
authorities and some kind of registration system.
47  At the same time, however, as in the 
German case, British policymakers rejected licensing and rulemaking, which existed in 
Sweden and France, but were perceived as bureaucratic and inconsistent with the 
informal and consensual British regulatory style.
48  And even the registration system 
alone proved a heavy burden for the Data Protection Registrar:  throughout the 1980s, a 
huge proportion of the agency’s resources were devoted to processing registration 
notices.   
  
  Enforcement powers, compared to France and Germany, were weak and were all 
tied to registration.  If a registered party was found to be in breach of one of the data 
protection principles—the substantive duties imposed by the privacy law—the Registrar 
had the power to issue an injunction (“enforcement notice”), de-register the operator, 
effectively barring it from doing business, or prohibit the operator from transferring 
personal data abroad.  Yet the latter two powers were never used, since they were 
considered too draconian, and enforcement notices were issued only infrequently—an 
average of three per year between 1987, when the power came into effect, and 1998, 
when the original law was overhauled.  Moreover, the Registrar was handicapped by a 
lack of administrative investigation powers.  Unlike French and German regulators, the 
British agency did not have the authority to inspect premises or compel information but 
rather had to apply for a court warrant based on evidence that there were “reasonable 
grounds” for suspecting a violation of the law.  The Registrar could also bring criminal 
prosecutions seeking fines but this power did not extend to the majority of privacy 
violations and the level of the fines was extraordinarily low, originally a maximum of 
£2,000 and later £5,000.    
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  The second major component of the British regulatory scheme was industry-
sponsored codes of practice.  In the original law, the Data Protection Registrar was 
instructed to encourage trade associations to develop their own codes of practice.  In the 
years that followed, the Data Protection Registrar vigorously promoted industry codes of 
practice as an important tool for improving privacy standards
49 and industry associations 
routinely consulted the Registrar on their proposed codes, resulting in roughly sixteen by 
1998.
50   
 
    The last component of the regulatory scheme was informal administrative 
dispute resolution.
51  Under the original law, the Data Protection Registrar had a duty to 
look into any complaint involving a “matter of substance” and to attempt to resolve the 
matter.  Since it was nearly impossible to determine from the face of a complaint whether 
a “matter of substance” had been raised, the Registrar’s policy was to inquire into all 
complaints.
52  The dispute resolution system proved to be immensely popular:  between 
1984 and 1998, the number of complaints filed with the agency grew from 11 to 4,173 
per year.  This type of routine dispute settlement is familiar from the section on Germany 
but the British case is unusual in that the Registrar had virtually no discretion to ignore 
complaints and direct scarce agency resources elsewhere.  In short, the British agency 
was styled as an ombudsman responsible for settling individual grievances, not as an 
agenda-setting policymaker or as a rule-enforcing policeman.  
 
  Even more so than in France and Germany, tort litigation was an insignificant part 
of British privacy regulation.  This is principally because the background principles of 
English common law on statutory torts stand out as particularly stingy towards 
plaintiffs.
53  In common law systems, breach of a statutory duty does not automatically 
give rise to a right to sue in court as it generally does in civil law systems.  Before a case 
may be brought, it must be demonstrated that the legislature, in enacting the statute, 
specifically intended to revamp the pre-existing common law framework by creating a 
new right of action.  The easiest way for the legislature to do so is to write a statutory 
provision giving victims a right of action.  And the drafters of the British privacy law 
limited this right of action to four, narrowly drawn classes of privacy breaches.  Tort 
litigation rates reflected this carefully constrained right of action:  according to a report 
from a specialized scholarly publication, there were only three cases seeking damages 
decided under the original British law.
54 
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50 See 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DATA PROTECTION, supra  note 20, §§5001-5361. 
51 See, e.g., Data Protection Registrar, Annual Report 1986/87, at 26-27 (1987). 
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V.  Forces for Change 
  
Since the 1970s and 1980s, when European data privacy regulation first took root, 
two dramatic changes have transformed the regulatory environment:  the digital 
revolution, which is closely connected to market liberalization, and the Europeanization 
of policymaking.   These forces have provoked change and convergence in all four 
national systems, moving them away from licensing and registration, and pushing them 
towards tough administrative enforcement of government standards and self-regulatory 
techniques.  In this section, I explore how the new digital marketplace and the 
Europeanization of policymaking have fostered this pattern of regulatory convergence.     
 
a.  The Digital Revolution and the Transformation of the Marketplace 
 
  The rise of digital technologies and the exponential growth of computing power 
have dramatically altered the nature of the data privacy regulatory problem.   Early on, 
only governments and large corporate actors like banks and telecommunications 
operators had the technological capacity necessary to process large quantities of data.  
Now, however, that the technology has become so sophisticated and cheap, everyone can 
collect, duplicate, store, and communicate vast quantities of digital information, 
anywhere in the world.  This has led to a host of new challenges for privacy regulators, 
the most important one for our purposes being the proliferation of market actors caught 
by privacy rules.  Today, not just the telephone company knows your personal habits, but 
the bookstore, the travel agent, and every other service and goods provider that operates 
over the internet.  Although in some respects these challenges are exceptional, the 
difference between privacy and other regulatory areas should be understood as one of 
degree, not in kind.  Market liberalization in Europe was driven by the extraordinary 
possibilities that digital technologies created for telecommunications, financial services, 
and other economic sectors, and, as a result, these new markets parallel the broader 
digital universe:  densely populated and complex, with a rapidly changing set of services 
and products on offer
 .
55  The market constraints that have shaped contemporary 
regulatory styles in the privacy arena are broadly similar to those in other policy areas 
and therefore the privacy case should be understood as belonging to the more general 
phenomenon of market liberalization.   
 
  The proliferation of regulated parties in the data privacy arena is directly 
responsible for one major shift in European regulatory styles:  national systems like 
France that previously relied on registration and licensing have had to drastically curtail 
the scope of application of these regulatory tools.  Too many individuals and firms are 
caught by blanket registration and licensing requirements for administrative agencies to 
be able to review registration notices and licensing applications in a meaningful way.   
Registration and licensing were originally adopted because they were believed to be 
flexible tools that would allow regulators to keep abreast of the changing digital 
environment and to respond, on a case-by-case basis, to new information systems. 
However, they are also resource-intensive policy tools that can only work in a cozy 
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regulatory environment of few actors and many government watchdogs, one which no 
longer exists in the privacy field.   
  
  In a parallel process, the new digital environment has rendered other regulatory 
instruments more attractive.  The sheer number of corporate actors that today come under 
the umbrella of data privacy regulation has fostered a style of regulatory enforcement 
oriented more towards deterrence than towards the management and remediation of 
breaches.  As we shall see, administrative inspections and regulatory sanctions are on the 
rise across all four national systems and one of the justifications for this shift has been the 
impossibility of inducing the numerous corporations caught by the rules to take privacy 
regulation seriously without the threat of enforcement actions.  The managerial, problem-
solving approach to enforcement of the past, with informal requests for information on 
corporate practices, individualized recommendations on how to improve privacy, and 
prospective administrative orders, setting out the steps necessary to come into 
compliance, is no longer perceived as adequate.   
 
The same market trends have also prompted national officials to promote self-
regulatory techniques.  To some extent, the impulse is to alleviate the burdens placed on 
over-taxed, under-resourced, government officials by shifting regulatory responsibility to 
the business community itself   More importantly, however, is the appreciation that in a 
context of extreme diversity, corporations are better placed than government to design 
and monitor the specific standards that are appropriate to their particular brand of digital 
technologies and privacy threats.  As will be discussed in greater detail below, a variety 
of self-regulatory techniques have emerged:  internal corporate compliance officers, self-
regulatory codes adopted by industry associations, privacy seal programs that seek to use 
markets to reward good corporate practices, and privacy management systems 
comparable to the ones that have been introduced in environmental protection.   These 
techniques differ in important respects, some representing traditional patterns of 
government-industry relations and others informed by contemporary thinking on 
responsive regulation, but they all allow for more industry initiative than classic 
command-and-control regulation.  
 
b.  The Europeanization of Policymaking 
 
  Although the new market environment is conducive to tough enforcement and 
self-regulation, the widespread adoption of these strategies has also been driven by the 
politics of Europeanization.  Notwithstanding their intrinsic appeal, policymakers still 
have a variety of regulatory options available to them and domestic regulatory styles are 
not easily malleable, embedded as they are in a thick set of institutions and cultural 
practices.  Indeed, in many places, the punitive tactics of tough enforcement and the 
private empowerment entailed by self-regulation have traditionally been suspect.  Thus, 
to understand why these regulatory strategies have been accepted across a broad range of 
national systems, it is necessary to turn to the legislative and regulatory politics of 
Europeanization. 
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  In 1995, the European Union became involved in the policy area for the first time, 
with the adoption of the EU Privacy Directive.
56  This has since been complemented by a 
series of sector-specific measures in telecommunications, police cooperation, and other 
areas, but the Directive continues to serve as the basic framework that guides all other 
policymaking in the field.  Although day-to-day implementation and enforcement was 
left to national authorities, the Directive’s drafters sought to guarantee that the privacy 
right would be adequately protected by setting down a common set of enforcement 
powers and redress mechanisms that had to be available nationally.  Their choices were 
influenced both by policy diffusion mechanisms and by the need to create credible 
commitments to safeguard against national defection at the implementation phase.  To the 
extent that these choices were compatible with the demands of the new digital 
marketplace, they have since shaped national regulatory styles.  The Privacy Directive 
also set into motion a governance process responsible for overseeing national 
implementation and this process has fostered convergence in ways similar to the earlier 
experience with drafting the Directive. 
 
1.  The Privacy Directive 
 
i.  Policy diffusion 
 
As has been demonstrated elsewhere, EU policies are rarely decided from scratch, 
but rather are shaped by competition among member states to incorporate their existing 
regulatory models into EU legislation.
57  Two important elements of the Privacy 
Directive were the product of transfer of national regulatory models to the whole of the 
European Union: the decision to include licensing and registration and the requirement 
that industry associations be allowed to come forward with self-regulatory codes of 
conduct.    
 
The provision on registration and licensing was one of the most controversial in 
the Directive.
 58  The original proposal, heavily influenced by the flexible German system, 
included no licensing and extremely limited registration requirements.
59  But when 
France, seeking to protect its existing regulatory system, opposed the proposal, it was 
modified to include extensive registration and licensing requirements.
60  Even though 
Britain, Germany, Ireland, Denmark, and a number of other northern countries doggedly 
fought this provision, on the grounds that it was unworkable and bureaucratic, it 
ultimately survived because of a narrowly tailored compromise designed to accommodate 
Germany, the most powerful member of the opposition.
 61   
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In this saga, the coercion and emulation mechanisms that have been identified in 
theories of international policy diffusion were at work.
62  France and Germany had no 
intention of making the costly changes necessary to rework their regulatory systems and, 
as the most powerful countries in the European Union, they could use their clout to 
ensure that their national systems would be included in the Directive.   Yet the voting 
rules in the Council of Ministers are such that France could not have imposed licensing 
and registration without support from a qualified majority of member states.  And this 
qualified majority came from countries with common administrative law traditions—
Greece, Italy, Spain, Belgium, and Luxembourg—most of which did not yet even have 
privacy legislation but nonetheless emulated the French position based on institutional 
and cultural affinities.  Ultimately, however, the powerful diffusion process that occurred 
in the legislative negotiations has not had a significant impact on national regulatory 
styles, and this is because registration and licensing have been undercut by the other 
major force for change, the digital revolution.  Policymakers in Britain, France, and Italy 
have all found registration and licensing to be unworkable and therefore they have 
devised myriad ways of whittling down these requirements, leaving little of the 
Directive’s original scheme in place.    
  
The other product of policy diffusion, industry self-regulatory codes, has been 
more successful.
63  Although these were already common regulatory practice in the 
Netherlands, Germany, Britain, and other northern countries, they are new to France and 
Italy, known to have closed administrative systems.  In the Council of Ministers, the 
Dutch delegation pushed for the adoption of their system of government-approved 
industry codes, portraying them as a highly effective regulatory technique.
64  Its proposal 
received universal support from the other national delegations, in part because codes of 
conduct were seen as a convenient device for extending the reach of privacy principles, 
and in part because the cost of adapting national regulatory systems was minimal.
65   In 
the case of self-regulatory codes of conduct, the policy diffusion mechanism was not 
coercion or emulation, but policy learning:  the drafters sought to draw on the lessons of 
the successful experience of one country in designing a common EU regulatory 
framework.  
 
ii.   Credible commitments 
 
Another important set of choices concerned the structure and powers of national 
privacy agencies:  they were required to act independently and to be endowed with a 
broad set of enforcement powers.
66  This Directive provision has had far-reaching 
consequences, for, in all four country cases, governments have been compelled to expand 
the administrative enforcement powers available to their regulators, and, in Germany, 
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privacy agencies have acquired greater independence from the executive branch.  The 
negotiating history of these requirements strongly supports the credible commitments 
theory of institutional design in the European Union.  In this literature, the European 
Commission and, to a lesser extent, the European Parliament are portrayed as the 
institutions responsible for the monitoring and sanctioning vital to credible commitments 
because of their impartial, supranational composition.
 67  Therefore, it is significant that, 
consistent with the theory, independence and enforcement were incorporated at the behest 
of the European Commission and the European Parliament, not the member states, and 
that these requirements were justified as necessary for protecting the privacy right at the 
national level.   
 
As explained above, independence was a common feature of European privacy 
regulation with the exception of Germany, where private-sector oversight at the Land 
level was generally located in the Ministry of Interior.  German privacy advocates were 
highly critical of this system and, together with the European Commission, they pushed 
for language stipulating that privacy agencies had to be independent.
68  This was justified 
as critical to making EU law and privacy rights effective on the ground.  In the Directive 
negotiations, Germany vigorously defended its system, with the other delegations 
passively looking on at what was perceived as a purely local dispute over how to 
structure the German regulatory system.
69  In fact, in the final version, the independence 
clause was considerably softened so that it only stipulated that regulators “act 
independently” but not that they be given structural independence through appointment 
and removal safeguards and other institutional devices.
70  Yet even so, as we shall see, 
Germany has continued to face pressure from German privacy advocates and the 
European Commission to grant complete independence to Land regulators, so powerful is 
the association between institutional independence and member-state compliance in 
European governance.  
 
Like independence, the catalogue of enforcement powers was supported by the 
Commission, this time in conjunction with the European Parliament.   Inspired by the 
consensual and managerial German model, the agency powers contemplated in the 
original Directive proposal were minimal, focusing mainly on the power to investigate 
possible privacy breaches and obtain information from data processors.
71  However, the 
European Parliament objected that this would make for weak enforcement of the right to 
privacy and it advocated a more comprehensive catalogue of powers.
72   With the backing 
of the European Commission, this catalogue of powers is what survived in the final 
version of the Directive. 
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iii.   Litigation 
  
One area in which the Directive did not have much of an impact was litigation. 
The litigation provision closely tracked the German system for statutory privacy torts:  
individuals were given a right of action in the courts for all violations of their national 
privacy legislation and the burden of proof on fault, i.e. intent or negligence, was shifted 
from the plaintiff to the defendant.
73  As we shall see, this provision prompted litigation-
friendly innovations in Britain.  But on the whole, it is remarkable for what it did not do: 
fault remained an element of the tort, even though delegations like the French one 
supported an objective, no-fault standard that reflected their existing system of statutory 
liability.
74  Although the Commission proposed that courts be required to award damages 
for emotional distress, the final version of the Directive left the matter entirely to the 
discretion of the member states.
75  And innovations such as minimum damages awards 
and fee-shifting provisions, styled after the American system, were never even mentioned 
as a possibility.  These attempts to improve litigation opportunities for privacy victims 
went nowhere because of the constant opposition of the member states:  national 
delegations were uniformly reluctant to change their existing systems of tort remedies, 
partially because of the fear of increased litigation, and partially because of the desire to 
avoid the unanticipated consequences that any disruption of their traditional systems of 
private law and civil litigation could provoke.
76  This unsuccessful experience with 
negotiating a more plaintiff-friendly tort system is illustrative of the larger difficulties 
that have been encountered by the European Commission in attempting to harmonize tort 
remedies in consumer law, environmental protection, and others areas of the law.  There 
is considerable resistance to tinkering with what is perceived to lie at the core of national 
legal systems.  
 
2.  EU Governance 
   
In the European Union, new policies typically bring with them a host of 
governance mechanisms designed to oversee compliance and to enable regulatory 
adaptation to changing circumstances.   In data privacy, the governance process comes in 
two distinct institutional forms:  centralized oversight by the European Commission and a 
decentralized network of national privacy regulators, called the Article 29 Working Party.   
 
Agency independence and deterrence-oriented enforcement have been pushed by 
both the Commission and the Article 29 Working Party.  In 2002, the Commission 
conducted a comprehensive review of the Privacy Directive.  The outcome was a ten-
point work program for improving national implementation in which one of the 
centerpieces was administrative enforcement—and not litigation, alternative dispute 
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resolution, licensing, and any number of other possible regulatory tools.
77  Shortly 
thereafter, the Commission prosecuted Britain and Germany for breaches of the Privacy 
Directive, Britain for not having endowed its privacy regulator with adequate 
investigative and sanctioning powers and Germany for not requiring that Land regulators 
be independent.  And when, in 2007, the Commission revisited national implementation 
of the Privacy Directive, its attention was again squarely on enforcement and 
independence:   
 
One concern is respect for the requirement that data protection supervisory 
authorities act in complete independence and are endowed with sufficient 
powers and resources to exercise their task.  These authorities are key 
building blocks in the system of protection conceived by the Directive and 
any failure to ensure their independence and powers has a wide-ranging 
negative impact on the enforcement of the data protection legislation.
 78 
 
Tough enforcement by agencies independent of political direction is clearly understood 
by the Commission to be the sine qua non of effective data privacy regulation.   
 
The Working Party has also pushed national authorities to take a more aggressive 
approach to privacy violations.  Among its many enforcement initiatives, it organized a 
closed, hands-on workshop of privacy regulators in which the Spanish authority, known 
as the toughest of all European regulators, explained how it conducts inspections and 
assesses fines.
79  Moreover, the Working Party has begun to stage joint investigations 
involving national privacy agencies across the European Union.  In 2007, after 
concluding its first joint privacy investigation, the Working Party strongly urged national 
regulators to use their inspection powers more aggressively and to go directly to firm 
premises to obtain access to corporate records and databases. 
80   
 
The insistence of both the Commission and the Working Party on tough 
regulatory enforcement—something which, as we have seen, was entirely alien to early 
national regulatory styles—can only be understood in light of the credible commitments 
logic analyzed earlier.   Implementation of privacy policy lies entirely in the hands of 
national governments and aggressive regulatory enforcement is one means of 
circumventing their policy discretion and ensuring that privacy rights are being enforced 
equally everywhere.  International policymakers, unlike national legislators, cannot rely 
on the allocation of financial resources and a common party affiliation to guarantee that 
policymaking will be followed by executive-branch implementation.  Rather, 
independence, administrative inspections, and sanctions have come to serve as alternative 
commitment devices. 
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  Self-regulation has also been promoted, generally beginning with initiatives taken 
by northern countries with a tradition of self-regulation, and then spreading through the 
network of privacy regulators to other member states.  For instance, the British regulator 
has championed two, related initiatives to encourage firms and government agencies to 
routinely build privacy guarantees into their information systems through critical self-
evaluation, stakeholder consultation, and creative privacy engineering —Privacy Impact 
Assessments and Privacy by Design.
81  These policy ideas have been put forward by the 
British regulator in a variety of European forums, including the annual meetings of 
European data protection commissioners, and are becoming increasingly popular among 
other national regulators too.
82  Privacy seal programs are another example of the 
diffusion of self-regulation through European networks.  A privacy seal is an official 
mark of good corporate practice that goes beyond the statutory minimum.  To obtain a 
privacy seal, firms must generally compile information on their privacy safeguards, draft 
a privacy statement designed for their customers, and be inspected by an independent 
auditor.  Privacy seals have been championed by the Privacy Commissioner of 
Schleswig-Holstein, which first established a privacy seal program locally and then 
obtained EU funding to develop a European privacy seal, as the leader of a Europe-wide 
consortium.
83  The French privacy agency has joined this consortium and has encouraged 
French business to take part in the program, and thus we see that this German initiative 
has begun to gain traction in other member states too.  
VI.  Contemporary Regulatory Styles 
 
  Even though Europeanization and the digital revolution have given rise to 
convergence, these common forces have been experienced differently in each country 
case.  This section traces the national pathways through which policymakers have cut 
back on licensing and registration, moved from negotiated to deterrence-oriented 
regulatory compliance, and, in France and Italy, come to promote self-regulation as a 
complement to state-imposed rules.  In each country, reform has proceeded through both 
major legislative innovation and the routine policymaking efforts of privacy regulators.   
 
a.  France 
 
When the new French privacy law was passed in 2004, it was universally 
understood as moving the French system away from so-called ex ante regulation—
preventing privacy violations through licensing—and towards ex post regulation—
reacting to privacy breaches by conducting investigations and punishing offenders.
84   
The new law eliminated the original two-track scheme of licensing for the public sector 
and notification for the private sector and replaced it with a narrow licensing requirement 
(autorisation), applicable only to those types of operations thought to present special 
privacy risks, and a general registration duty (notification), applicable to all other 
                                                 
81 Information Commissioner’s Office, Privacy Impact Assessment Handbook, December 11, 2007; 
Information Commissioner’s Office, Privacy by Design, November 2008.  
82 European Privacy and Data Protection Commissioner’s Conference, Edinburgh, April 23-24, 2009. 
83 Information on the European Privacy Seal available at  www.european-privacy-seal.eu. 
84 Act 2004-801 of 6 August 2004. 28 
 
operations.  And since the agency’s rulemaking power was retained, very few operations 
today are caught by either licensing or registration.   At the same time, the array of 
administrative sanctions was dramatically expanded:  administrative injunctions, 
administrative fines, orders blocking data processing, and temporary injunctive orders 
were all added to the French regulatory toolbox.  
 
This new ex post regulatory philosophy has been enthusiastically embraced by the 
French privacy agency (CNIL).  Its previously meek approach to enforcement has been 
replaced by a tough strategy of widespread government inspections and administrative 
sanctions for rule-breakers.  The diagram below contains data on the number of 
administrative inspections carried out annually by CNIL.  Throughout the 1990s, the 
numbers were low, but after 2004, when the new privacy law was passed, they sky-
rocketed.  
 
Source:  CNIL, Annual Reports 
 
The next chart shows annual figures for administrative injunctions and administrative 
fines, both of which were new powers introduced in 2004.  The numbers on 
administrative injunctions are high and show a constant upwards trajectory, while the 
numbers on administrative fines are significant but lower since fines can be assessed only 
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after an operator fails to come into compliance with an injunction. 
 
Source:  CNIL, Annual Reports 
 
  What has driven French policymakers to re-engineer their data privacy system?   
Compliance with the EU Directive was one motivating factor, since the specifics of 
registration, licensing, and enforcement were somewhat different from the French law.
85  
The principal rationale, however, was the mismatch between a system centered largely on 
the licensing of big public databanks and the new digital marketplace.  The view among 
French policymakers was that the old regulatory scheme had to be retooled to reflect the 
new reality of widespread data use throughout the public and private sectors and that 
what was needed was not more licensing, which was considered impracticable, but 
tougher sanctions to deter corporations from flouting the rules.
86  Thus they introduced a 
wide range of sanctioning powers that have been vigorously applied by a regulatory 
agency that likewise views deterrence as necessary for inducing corporate actors to take 
their privacy duties seriously.   
 
In addition to the shift from ex ante to ex post regulation, the French system now 
carves out significant space for self-regulation.  In the new law, French policymakers 
looked to the example of Germany to design a system in which corporations that appoint 
internal compliance officers are exempted from licensing and registration.  CNIL has 
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taken extraordinary steps to encourage this self-regulatory practice by creating a special 
agency department to assist internal compliance officers and conducting regular training 
programs, with the result that, by the end of 2008, there were almost one thousand 
internal compliance officers.
87  Again taking the lead from Germany, the new French law 
established an official privacy seal program and, as mentioned earlier, the French 
regulator has partnered with the Schleswig-Holstein Privacy Commissioner to develop 
and administer a Europe-wide privacy seal.  Furthermore, self-regulatory industry codes 
were introduced to comply with the Dutch-inspired provision of the Directive.  So far 
CNIL has approved two industry codes, both related to direct marketing, and it is 
considering two others on call centers and commercial solicitations.
88  Mention should 
also be made of CNIL’s efforts to encourage AFNOR, the French industry association 
responsible for technical standards, to develop privacy standards.  Taken together, this 
flurry of activity represents a dramatic transformation of the relationship between French 
regulators and market actors and it is clear from the legislative debates that international 
policy diffusion has contributed to the trend.
 89  The fact that these instruments had 
already been adopted elsewhere in Europe and appeared to have worked well there was a 
powerful rationale for experimenting with those same instruments in France.  
 
To conclude this discussion of the contemporary French regulatory style, let us 
dwell for a moment on what did not change—litigation.  The government report that 
prepared the way for the new privacy law proposed that it include a provision making 
statutory violations into strict liability torts, reasoning that such a change would better 
further the purposes of the Directive.
90  Yet this proposal never went anywhere and 
therefore, as before, privacy violations are litigated under the standard background rules 
on statutory torts.  This aborted reform attempt is reminiscent of the debates on the 
original French law in the 1970s.  The government report that preceded the original law 
proposed facilitating tort litigation based, tellingly, on the American system of generous 
standing rules and one-way fee-shifting arrangements (meaning that defendants bear their 
legal costs and attorneys fees, regardless of the outcome of the litigation).
91  But this pro-
plaintiff recommendation was summarily dismissed.  In other words, French lawmakers 
are extraordinarily constant in their resistance to anything that deviates from the standard 
tort regime that has been developed under the Civil Code.   
 
Unsurprisingly, litigation rates in the 2000s showed no increase over the 1980s 
and 1990s.  Between 2000 and 2007, the number of statutory tort cases decided annually 
by the Court of Cassation has ranged between 2 and 3.  During the same time, the number 
of administrative law challenges to CNIL decisions has ranged between 0 and 3.     
 
b.  Germany 
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As elsewhere, in Germany, the self-regulatory and administrative enforcement 
components of data privacy regulation have been enhanced over the past decade.   
However, the most remarkable aspect of the German experience compared to the other 
country cases is the stability of its regulatory model.  As before, data privacy policy is 
implemented through a combination of self-regulation, informal dispute resolution, and 
steady administrative enforcement, all set in the broader context of a hard, constitutional 
right to data privacy.   
 
The new federal privacy law, enacted in 2001, significantly expanded the 
enforcement powers of private-sector regulators at the Land level.
 92  In the new scheme, 
administrative enforcement is no longer inextricably linked to informal dispute 
resolution, but rather can be independently and strategically deployed by privacy 
regulators.  While before administrative investigations had to be triggered by an 
individual complaint, regulators can now investigate suspected privacy infringements on 
their own initiative and, if administrative sanctions alone are considered inadequate, they 
have the power to refer violations to the criminal prosecutor’s office.  The fining powers 
of private-sector regulators have also been expanded considerably.  Before most 
violations of privacy law were treated as criminal offenses, but in the new law, the vast 
majority have been converted into administrative offenses, with the few remaining 
criminal sanctions being reserved for offenses committed with an especially culpable 
state of mind.   
 
These improved powers were all added to comply with the EU Directive.
93  The 
exclusively external origin of change sets Germany apart from the rest of the country 
cases, where tougher administrative enforcement has been driven not only by EU politics 
but also by domestic dissatisfaction with old regulatory tools.  In contrast, German 
policymakers were fairly content with existing compliance levels and moved to improve 
investigation and sanctioning powers only when pushed to do so by Europeanization.  
 
It appears that German regulators are making moderate but consistent use of their 
enforcement powers.  The first graph shows the number of investigations and on-site 
inspections that were conducted annually in Hesse.  Notwithstanding the recent 
decoupling of enforcement from dispute resolution, most investigations are still begun in 
response to individual complaints and therefore, in contrast with the other country cases, 
what is reported as an investigation can be as simple as a quick telephone call to the 
alleged offender.   However, on-site inspections were also reported, and since an on-site 
inspection represents a fairly aggressive regulatory strategy, these figures give an idea of 
the administrative resources that were devoted to formal and adversarial regulatory 
enforcement as opposed to negotiated compliance.  It is obvious that compliance is 
coming to absorb a growing amount of administrative resources and that  adversarial 
tactics are part of the repertoire of agency action.  At the same time, the low ratio of 
inspections to investigations overall suggests that the Hessian regulator continues to 
prefer informal avenues of dispute resolution and that the traditional German regulatory 
style of negotiated compliance is eroding only slowly.  
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  Source:  Hesse, Annual Reports 
 
To get an idea of what is happening outside of Hesse, there is one study available 
on sanctions throughout Germany in 2002-2007.  The results are reproduced in the table 
below.  These figures show that administrative sanctions are not simply a matter of law-
on-the-books but rather are consistently applied by the Land authorities and can be 
expected to have a deterrence effect.  However, the numbers are low given the size of the 
German population and again they suggest that the managerial German enforcement style 
is slow to change.  
  
Germany—Regulatory sanctions, 2002-2007 
 
Year Regulatory  sanctions 
October 2002-August 2003  34 
September 2003-August 2004  77 
September 2004-August 2005  51 
September 2005-August 2006  49 
September 2006-August 2007  45 
 
Source: Evelyn Seiffert, Hamburg Authority, “Bussgelder und Strafanzeigen” 
 
  Agency independence, the other component of a legalistic regulatory style, has 
also improved over the past decade.  As was explained earlier, the German government 
successfully resisted structural independence for privacy authorities in the EU Directive 
and therefore, going by the formal letter of the law, nothing had to change in Germany to 
come into compliance.  However, in the 1990s and 2000s, a number of German legal 
scholars and data protection officials used the Directive’s independence provision to 
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argue that private-sector oversight had to be transferred from Land ministries to Land 
data protection commissioners (which are independent but only have jurisdiction over the 
public sector). 
94  Although they did not prevail in the debates on the new federal law, 
they successfully persuaded a number of Land governments to transfer all regulatory 
power to their independent data protection commissioners.
95  Moreover, as was discussed 
earlier, the European Commission has prosecuted Germany for breaching the Directive 
and therefore, depending on the outcome of the case, all Länder might yet be forced to 
switch to a system of independent privacy agencies.
96  Here we see how the logic of 
credible commitments and the understanding of administrative independence as key to 
the rigorous enforcement of EU law have played out on the ground in Germany.   
 
The drafting of the federal privacy law was also taken as an opportunity to 
experiment with new self-regulatory devices, in line with Germany’s cooperative 
regulatory style.  In addition to the existing devices of internal compliance officers and 
industry agreements, the new legislation mandated a privacy seal program.  More 
importantly, an official report was commissioned from a group of German legal scholars 
on strategies for modernizing German data privacy regulation, designed to inform a 
second wave of privacy reforms once the immediate necessity of implementing the 
Directive had passed.
97  The report consisted entirely of recommendations for new forms 
of self-regulation and although the government has yet to implement these 
recommendations, they have been roundly applauded by the German community of 
privacy experts and data protection commissioners.
98   
 
  The last point to make is that, as in France, nothing has altered on the litigation 
front.  There were no significant changes made to litigation rights in the new law and the 
level of tort litigation for statutory privacy violations remains low.  To give an idea of the 
litigation component of German privacy regulation, the table below shows the annual 
number of statutory tort cases in my data set that were brought in the main court system, 
which has jurisdiction over both civil and criminal litigation but not labor cases.  For 
feasibility reasons, the data on the highest court (Bundesgerichthof) go back to the time 
of the enactment of the original federal privacy law while the data on the lower courts 
start in 1990. (The courts of first instance are the Amtsgericht for low-value claims and 
the Landgericht for high-value claims and the courts of appeal are the Landgericht and 
the Oberlandesgericht.)   As the table demonstrates, litigation remains minimal. 
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Germany—Cases decided, 1978-2007 
 
Year  First 
Instance 
Second 
Instance 
Supreme 
Court   Year First 
Instance
Second 
Instance
Supreme 
Court 
             
1978  Nd  Nd  1   1993 0 1 0 
1979  Nd  Nd  0   1994 1 1 0 
1980  Nd  Nd  0   1995 1 1 0 
1981  Nd  Nd  2   1996 3 3 0 
1982  Nd  Nd  2   1997 2 3 0 
1983  Nd  Nd  3   1998 4 2 0 
1984  Nd  Nd  1   1999 1 1 0 
1985  Nd  Nd  2   2000 2 5 2 
1986  Nd  Nd  0   2001 3 1 1 
1987  Nd  Nd  1   2002 4 3 1 
1988  Nd  Nd  1   2003 4 4 3 
1989  Nd  Nd  0   2004 2 5 0 
1990  0  2  1   2005 3 3 1 
1991  0  0  0   2006 3 6 2 
1992  0  0  0   2007 3 5 0 
 
nd:  no data 
Source:  Beck Online   
 
c.  Britain 
 
  Among the three early national systems, the British one has undergone the most 
radical transformation:  what was once a consensual and informal national regulatory 
style has given way to a tougher, more legalistic approach to policymaking.   A number 
of changes have been made, most of which began with the new British privacy law 
enacted in 1998.
99  First, in response to the widespread use of digital technologies and the 
increasing burden that registration has placed on administrative resources, the registration 
system has been cut back considerably so that it now applies only to a limited subset of 
personal data operations.
100     
 
  Second, the Information Commissioner’s Office, as the British privacy regulator 
is now known, has shed its ombudsman function.  The administrative complaints 
procedure has been transformed into what is now called a “request for assessment”:  
privacy victims are expected to come forward with evidence of the alleged violation and 
based on this evidence and any reply given by the wrongdoer, the Commissioner makes a 
determination of whether a breach of the Data Protection Act is likely or unlikely.  
Armed with this administrative determination, individuals are charged with vindicating 
                                                 
99 Data Protection Act 1998.   
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their rights directly, before the recalcitrant corporation or government agency, and, if 
need be, in litigation before the courts.  The onus, therefore, is now on the victim, not the 
Commissioner, to bring an end to private disputes.  This new procedure also gives the 
Commissioner more discretion than in the past over whether to consider a complaint in 
the first place.  This discretion is used to focus on those complaints that raise important 
matters of policy or systematic enforcement problems and, indeed, most complaints are 
dismissed before they get to the dispute resolution stage.
101  In sum, the administrative 
burden of amicably resolving privacy disputes has been dramatically reduced and the 
complaints procedure is now styled as a complement to agency policymaking and 
enforcement, similar to the French case.  
 
  Third, in 1998, the Information Commissioner obtained rulemaking powers for 
the first time.  Although the privacy regulator had before used informal recommendations 
to assist industry with compliance, the new law expressly directs the Information 
Commissioner to advise the public on “good practice.”  Moreover, the Information 
Commissioner has obtained the power to promulgate rules (“codes of practice for 
guidance as to good practice”) for different sectors and types of privacy issues.  This is a 
more flexible mode of regulation compared to traditional administrative rules, i.e., 
statutory instruments, but it nonetheless represents an improvement in the 
Commissioner’s ability to set the terms of privacy protection.  Today there are four 
official codes of practice, covering employment practices, telecommunications directory 
information, CCTVs, and internal corporate data-sharing.   Furthermore, the 
Commissioner has been extremely active in formulating informal guidance and today 
there are thirty-four “good practice notes” and twenty-five “technical guidance notes” in 
force.
102  As with the reduction of registration, this expansion of rulemaking power has 
been driven by the proliferation of market actors and the belief that only with more 
specific regulatory standards, tailored to different types of data operations, is it possible 
to secure compliance among the many users of digital technologies.        
 
  Fourth, the Commisioner’s enforcement powers have been improved.  In 1998, to 
facilitate investigations, administrative subpoenas (“information notices”) were added to 
the Commissioner’s regulatory toolkit.  Moreover, in a series of amendments enacted in 
2008 and 2009, the Commissioner was given the power to conduct searches of 
government offices (“assessment notices”) without a court warrant
103 and the power to 
impose administrative fines (“monetary penalty notices”) for one important type of 
privacy violation—the intentional or reckless disclosure or obtaining of personal data.
104  
Last, in contrast with the past when criminal penalties were limited to fines and low ones 
at that, custodial sentences are now available for one of the most common privacy crimes,  
the unlawful obtaining, buying, or selling of personal information.
105   
 
                                                 
101 See Faye Spencer, How the ICO deals with complaints, powerpoint presentation at the Data Protection 
Officers Conference 2009.    
102 See http://www.ico.gov.uk/Home/what_we_cover/data_protection/guidance.aspx (last visited March 1, 
2010). 
103 Coroners and Justice Act § 173.   
104 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 § 144. 
105 Id. § 77. 36 
 
  It is unclear whether, in practice, the British privacy agency has moved towards a 
more punitive style of regulatory enforcement.  For some of these enforcement powers, it 
is simply too early to tell.  For those enforcement powers that are long-standing, either 
the data are not available (information notices) or they are erratic (search warrants and 
enforcement notices).  However, beginning in 2004, when, as will be discussed below, 
the European Commission brought an enforcement action against Britain, the numbers 
have increased.  Whether this trend will continue remains to be seen. 
 
Britain—Administrative enforcement 
 
Year  Search Warrants  Enforcement Notices 
2003/04 0  Nd 
2004/05 6  3 
2005/06 9  4 
2006/07 12  7 
2007/08 7  13 
2008/09 14  9 
 
Source:  Information Commissioner’s Office, Annual Reports and correspondence with 
Information Commissioner’s Office 
 
  The fifth change made in the new privacy law was to expand litigation rights.  
While before individuals could sue for only four types of data privacy violations, the new 
law contains a general right of action, empowering individuals to sue for all statutory 
breaches.  This change is reflected in litigation rates.
106  The graph below shows the 
number of cases alleging privacy violations that were decided by the High Court, one of 
the first instance courts with jurisdiction over privacy disputes and the only one whose 
decisions are consistently reported in the major electronic databases.  Before 1989, my 
data set contains no cases and between 1989 and 1999, only four cases were litigated.  
But since 2000, plaintiffs have begun to raise data privacy claims more consistently.  The 
numbers are still low but they have increased and they suggest that Britain is moving 
towards the norm for other European legal systems.  In other words, as in France and 
Germany, individuals occasionally sue for privacy violations, but the threat of litigation 
remains quite remote and therefore administrative agencies still continue to bear primary 
responsibility for regulatory policy.    
                                                 
106 As for administrative law litigation, it remains negligible.  Only one case, dating to 2006, has ever been 
decided by the courts in the history of the British privacy agency and it involved not the private sector, but 
a dispute between the Information Commissioner’s Office and the executive branch over a national security 
issue.  Secretary of State v. The Information Tribunal [2006] EWHC 2958 (Admin). 
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Source:  Westlaw, UK-RPTS-ALL 
 
  Last, in what remains virtually the only element of continuity between 
contemporary and earlier regulatory practice, the Information Commissioner continues to 
promote industry self-regulation.  As was described earlier, the Commissioner has 
championed two, related initiatives to encourage firms and government agencies to build 
privacy guarantees into their information systems and business practices—Privacy 
Impact Assessments and Privacy by Design.  The Commissioner has invested 
considerable agency resources in promoting these self-regulatory tools, including 
extensive guidance materials and an ongoing series of workshops and seminars for 
corporate privacy officers.  
 
  The shift away from negotiated compliance towards rulemaking, agency 
enforcement, and some litigation was, in equal parts, a British response to the changing 
marketplace and a product of Europeanization.  As early as 1990, British government 
officials agreed that registration should be eliminated and that the agency’s rulemaking 
and enforcement powers should be enhanced.
107  Registration was seen as a regulatory 
burden, with no pay off in terms of privacy protection, and increasingly unsustainable in 
the face of the proliferation of market actors using digital technologies.  Shortly thereafter 
the administrative dispute resolution system also came under fire as a resource-intensive, 
                                                 
107 Review of the Data Protection Act:  Report on Structure--The Home Office, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DATA 
PROTECTION, supra note 20 at 4824, 4840; Data Protection Act 1984: A Review by the Data Protection 
Registrar, Annual Report 1988/89. 
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ineffective device for achieving compliance.
108 This informal and individualized system 
of remedies was simply unable to keep pace with the widespread privacy violations 
occurring in the corporate (and government) world.  What was needed, according to this 
line of thinking, was more precise standards and better enforcement tools, designed to 
deter breaches of these standards.
109  With the exception of strong enforcement powers, 
the British government embraced this reform program in the new 1998 privacy law.  And 
even on enforcement powers, the government was eventually moved to action after it was 
confronted with dramatic evidence of serious privacy breaches occurring throughout the 
public and private sectors.  As explained earlier, most of the Information Commissioner’s 
new powers were introduced in 2008 and 2009, and this was in direct response to a string 
of politically embarrassing data privacy fiascoes—the loss of sensitive personal data on 
the approximately 25 million British citizens receiving child benefits, the use of data 
brokers to secretly vet employees, and more.
110  
 
  Notwithstanding the domestic impetus for change, the legalistic, credible 
commitments dimension of Europeanization has also played a role in transforming the 
traditionally informal British regulatory process.  In 2004, the European Commission 
opened an infringement procedure against Britain:  the British privacy law did not 
include adequate inspection and fining powers, as required by the Directive.
111  In 
subsequent talks between the European Commission and the British regulator, the British 
regulator agreed to make better use of its existing investigation and sanctioning powers. 
And even though new enforcement powers have recently been enacted, the European 
Commission continues to exert pressure on Britain to show that these powers are 
adequate and are being used on a regular basis.      
 
  Furthermore, on the question of litigation rights, the historical record shows that 
Europeanization was the cause of change.  In 1990, the British government had 
considered a right of action for all violations of the data privacy law but had rejected the 
proposal on the grounds that a general right of action could encourage “frivolous” claims, 
produce unlimited damages awards, and induce the privacy agency to adopt a more 
“confrontational approach,” which was considered inferior to the existing “negotiated, 
consensual approach.”
112  The British government was clearly afraid of stoking a 
regulatory culture akin to American adversarial legalism.  But once the EU Directive was 
passed, the government no longer had any room for action, and had to create a general 
right of action to comply with the Directive’s litigation provision.  In essence, it was 
forced to alter the common law system of statutory torts, in which the legislative branch 
is firmly in control of what does and does not get litigated in the courts, to bring it into 
line with the civil law system, in which all breaches of regulatory statutes can potentially 
                                                 
108 Data Protection Registrar, Consultation Paper on the EC Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC):  
Response of the Data Protection Registrar, July 1996 at 84-85 (on file with author). 
109 Id. at 46.    
110 See Commentary from the Information Commissioner’s Office, 2
nd Reading in the House of Lords, May 
18, 2009. 
111 Peter Chapman, Bolkenstein rebukes UK over lack of data privacy, THE EUROPEAN VOICE, July 15, 
2004. 
112 Review of the Data Protection Act:  Report on Structure--The Home Office, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DATA 
PROTECTION, supra note 20 at 4824, 4835. 39 
 
get litigated under the general tort provisions of the Civil Code.  Today, the litigation 
issue is still alive:  according to the European Commission, this British litigation right is 
too stingy to satisfy the requirements of the Directive.  In the infringement proceeding 
just mentioned, the European Commission has alleged a number of shortcomings with the 
British data privacy tort:  the courts should not require material damages to be proven 
before awarding damages for emotional distress; and the courts are allowed too much 
discretion in deciding whether to award injunctive relief such as the erasure or blocking 
of inaccurate personal data.  It is too soon to tell whether the British government will 
budge on the issue, but if my earlier analysis of resistance to change on the institutional 
dimension of regulatory styles is correct, then we would expect the European 
Commission to be less successful on the litigation issue than on punitive agency 
enforcement. 
 
d.  Italy 
  
  Italy first enacted data privacy legislation in 1996.
113  As in Britain in 1984, the 
adoption of privacy regulation was externally driven.   Italy wished to join the Schengen 
Agreement, an intra-European effort to cooperate on immigration and law enforcement 
which centered on a common database known as the Schengen Information System and 
due to come into force in 1995.  To join, countries had to have data privacy legislation to 
ensure responsible use of the Schengen Information System.  Without privacy legislation, 
Italy faced the prospect of being left outside of this European club, and therefore Italian 
policymakers sprang into action. 
 
  At the heart of the Italian regulatory scheme is an independent commission with 
extensive powers.  As in France, the Italian privacy agency (Garante per la protezione 
dei dati personali or Garante) administers a registration and licensing system and wields 
related rulemaking powers.  When the law was first passed, the registration requirement 
(notificazione) was near-universal, but, as in Britain and France, it soon became clear that 
this scheme created an unsustainable burden for regulators and digital-technology users 
alike.  Therefore, by 2003, only those firms engaged in operations considered particularly 
hazardous, e.g., databases on creditworthiness and genetic profiles, were required to 
register.  Furthermore, administrative licenses (autorizzazione) are required for 
operations involving sensitive data such as race and for transfers of personal data to third 
countries that lack an adequate level of data protection.  Operations, however, can be 
exempted from licensing based on administrative rules (autorizzazione generale) and 
since licensing, like notification, has proven to be extraordinarily burdensome, the 
Garante has made extensive use of this power.  
 
  As elsewhere, self-regulation is used in the Italian system.  Industry and 
professional associations are allowed to come forward with self-regulatory codes for 
official approval (codici di deontologia e di buona condotta) and they have done so in 
                                                 
113 Legge 31 dicembre 1996, n. 675.   The essential primer on the Italian law is GIOVANNI BUTTARELLI, 
BANCHE DATI E TUTELA DELLA RISERVATEZZA (1997).  This account of the Italian framework is also based 
on the Garante’s Annual Reports and interviews with Garante officials conducted on April 11, 13, & 14, 
2003 and January 27, 2010. 40 
 
considerable numbers.  The Garante has approved more codes than any other regulator in 
this study:   there are currently seven in force, one each for defense investigations, credit 
databases, personal data used for statistical and scientific purposes, the national statistics 
system, historical research, and journalists. 
 
Turning to compliance, Italian regulators wield the full array of enforcement 
powers.  There is an administrative subpoena power and an administrative inspection 
power, and the latter is more extreme than anywhere else:  unlike France, Britain, and 
Germany, where a court order must be obtained before the police can be used to force 
entry, in Italy, the privacy agency can enlist the police directly, without a court 
application.  Privacy violations can be punished with various sanctions:  the regulator 
may order remedial measures, prohibit data processing operations, impose administrative 
fines, and refer offenses to the public prosecutor for a possible criminal action.   
Moreover, since the Italian law was first enacted, the administrative fining power has 
been improved a number of times, and therefore today the statutory maximums are much 
higher than they were originally and the types of privacy breaches that constitute 
administrative offenses are more extensive. 
 
The practice of regulatory enforcement has been remarkably aggressive.  
Although the numbers were not consistently reported in the early years of the law, they 
were low overall since most of the Garante’s resources were dedicated to educating the 
business community and disseminating information on data protection rights and duties.  
In recent years, however, the focus has shifted to enforcement and, as the graph below 
shows, the numbers on official agency inspections and administrative sanctions have 
exploded.     41 
 
 
Source:  Garante, Annual Reports 
 
In a unique twist of the Italian scheme, the privacy agency also manages a system 
of administrative adjudication.   This procedure mimics adjudication in a civil law court:  
once a complaint is filed, the Garante investigates the charge, hears the parties, decides 
the case, and affords a remedy to the victim with an administrative injunction.  Italian 
administrative adjudication is considerably more formal and binding than the ombudsman 
dispute settlement that is practiced in Germany and that was characteristic of the early 
British scheme.  It has also proven to be immensely popular, with more than 3,500 cases 
decided over the past ten years.   
 
The last part of the Italian framework that speaks to regulatory styles is the system 
of statutory tort litigation.  In Italy, the background rules on when individuals can sue for 
breaches of regulatory statutes are quite similar to German law.   In the privacy law, these  
background rules were altered somewhat to make it easier to litigate:  the same burden-
shifting rule for proving fault that applies in cases involving ultra-hazardous activities 
was adopted and damages for emotional distress were made available across-the-board.   
However, as the table below demonstrates, Italian litigation rates in the court of last resort 
(Court of Cassation) remain low.  In the courts of first instance (tribunali), litigation rates 
are erratic and considerably higher but even so, they are insignificant when compared to 
the enforcement and adjudication activities of the privacy agency.  
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Italy—Cases decided, 1996-2007 
 
Year  First 
Instance 
Court of 
Cassation    Year  First 
Instance 
Court of 
Cassation 
1996  0  0    2002  8  1 
1997  0  0    2003  11  1 
1998  0  0    2004  12  4 
1999  5  0    2005  12  2 
2000  3  1    2006  4  5 
2001  3  1    2007  5  1 
 
Source:  Repertorio Foro Italiano, Giurisprudenza; Lex24 & Repertorio24; LexItalia.it 
 
 This  Italian  architecture  is punitive while at the same time allowing for self-
regulation and, overall, it is consistent with data privacy regulation elsewhere.   Although 
the timing of the Italian law was driven by the Schengen Information System, the content 
was profoundly influenced by another European legal instrument, the EU Privacy 
Directive.  The Italian law was drafted at the same time as the Directive was being 
negotiated, and therefore many provisions were lifted straight from the Directive, 
including registration and licensing, the extensive array of agency enforcement powers, 
and self-regulatory codes of conduct.  In conjunction with pressure from the European 
network of privacy regulators, this legislative scheme has given rise to tough, deterrence-
oriented enforcement tactics.  Even though the Italian state, like France, is generally 
characterized as hostile to industry participation in policymaking, today, self-regulation is 
being used because of the policy diffusion process that occurred with industry codes of 
conduct.  As in France and Britain, flexible registration and licensing have been cut back 
dramatically under the pressure of the ever-expanding digital marketplace.  And tort 
litigation, as in the other country cases, is a minor component of the regulatory scheme.   
VII.  Beyond Privacy:  Other Policy Areas 
 
  The pattern of European regulatory convergence experienced in the data privacy 
field is evident in a number of other policy areas too.  In this section I briefly review 
legislation and secondary literature on consumer protection, anti-discrimination policy, 
and environmental protection, and I suggest that the same market and Europeanization 
forces have induced national regulators to adopt legalistic enforcement strategies and 
self-regulatory instruments in these areas too.   Although far too broad a phenomenon to 
substantiate fully here, the claim is that tough administrative enforcement and self-
regulation, set in a context of low judicial intervention, are emblematic of contemporary 
European regulatory styles. 
 
The European Union has taken extensive action on consumer protection and 
making these consumer rights effective on the ground, in national regulatory systems, has 
always been a major source of concern.  In the 1980s, the principal compliance strategy 43 
 
promoted by the European Commission was consumer litigation.
114  But these efforts 
proved ineffective and therefore, by the late 1990s, the focus had shifted to regulatory 
enforcement and alternative dispute resolution.
115  The legislative output seeking to 
harmonize national regulatory styles has been formidable and the content largely mirrors 
the approach taken in the Privacy Directive:  independent consumer agencies and 
extensive enforcement powers.
116  In addition, member states must give their consumers 
access to cheap, fast alternative dispute resolution, which in many national systems is 
handled by industry associations or individual firms and therefore represents a form of 
self-regulation.
117  Although the European Commission has put forward ambitious 
proposals to facilitate consumer and anti-trust litigation, they have been drastically cut 
back to accommodate hostile national governments and, therefore, any legislation that 
eventually passes will fall far short of American-style class actions.
118   A recent study on 
national regulatory systems suggests that these consumer protection initiatives have 
provoked a pattern of convergence similar to the data privacy case.
119  In Britain and the 
Netherlands, traditionally informal regulatory styles have given way to more legalistic 
compliance strategies, with the addition of independent consumer agencies and better 
enforcement powers.  In sum, in consumer policy we observe the same mix of hard, 
legalistic enforcement, self-regulation, and resistance to tort litigation as in the data 
privacy case. 
 
Anti-discrimination legislation in the European Union covers the whole gamut of 
suspect categories, from sex, to race, age, and more.
120  This legislation, like the Privacy 
Directive, seeks to promote the uniform enforcement of anti-discrimination rights with a 
standard set of national remedies and administrative powers.   Similar to the privacy case, 
at the epicenter of this Europeanized regulatory template is a powerful, independent 
human rights agency.  At the implementation phase, both the European Commission and 
the network of European human rights experts have put pressure on national governments 
to improve the independence and the powers of their human rights agencies, 
demonstrating that the credible commitments logic that I explored earlier is also at work 
in anti-discrimination policy.
121  Self-regulation is another component of this 
Europeanized regulatory template:   the legislation encourages agreements between labor 
unions and employer associations, modeled after labor law in Scandinavia, Germany, and 
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elsewhere.
122  Last, American-style litigation was left out of the legislation.  In what, by 
now, is a familiar sequence of events, the Commission sought to facilitate litigation on a 
broad scale by giving human rights groups standing to litigate discrimination cases 
without having to prove harm to individual victims, but the proposal was beaten back by 
national governments fearful of fomenting American adversarial legalism.
123 Thus in 
anti-discrimination policy too, the process of regulatory convergence has mimicked the 
dynamics of the privacy case.  
 
  Environmental protection is the last policy area to be considered here.  
Environmental protection is generally taken as a prime example of what has been called 
the “new governance” turn in EU policymaking.  As documented by a number of 
scholars, the European Commission has come to champion a more flexible and 
participatory set of alternatives to classic command-and-control regulation.  This has 
come in the shape of self-regulatory instruments such as private certification schemes, 
voluntary industry-government agreements, and information disclosure requirements.
124  
Although the new governance literature generally does not explore their origins, most 
were first developed in countries like Britain and Germany with traditionally flexible 
regulatory styles and, later, were promoted by these same countries in the EU 
policymaking process.
125  In other words, the same diffusion mechanisms that led to the 
broad-based adoption of self-regulatory instruments in the privacy case have also been at 
work in environmental protection.   
 
At the same time, EU policymakers have sought to address mounting frustration 
with uneven national compliance by forcing member states to adopt tougher regulatory 
sanctions.  Although historically criminal law was off-limits to the European Union, 
criminal sanctions have recently been imposed for the scores of EU environmental laws 
that have been passed since the 1970s.
126  Moreover, a recent directive on environmental 
harm requires that national environmental agencies be equipped with extensive 
investigative and remedial powers, so that firms will be forced to clean up the 
environment and stop polluting.
127  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the European 
Commission had favored a civil liability approach to environmental harm, which was 
openly modeled on American environmental law and entailed a significant role for 
private litigation in forcing polluters to comply.
128  Yet resistance from the member states 
was so great that the Commission moved to an agency-centered model, which is what 
eventually passed.  This episode is yet another illustration of the difficulty of changing 
the institutional dimension of national regulatory styles and the European preference for 
administrative agencies over courts as a vehicle for policymaking and regulatory 
compliance.  To conclude, in environmental protection as in data privacy, 
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Europeanization does not appear to be generating a more litigious system but rather is 
forcing national regulators to create more space for self-regulation and to aggressively 
pursue those who break the law. 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
  This study has demonstrated that European regulatory styles in the data privacy 
field are converging, not on adversarial litigation as anticipated in Americanization 
theory, but on a model of self-regulation and deterrence-oriented enforcement of 
government standards.  In contrast with the past, when privacy compliance was achieved 
primarily through individualized and flexible forward-looking remedial measures, 
contemporary regulators are using the threat of inspections and sanctions to induce 
markets actors to take privacy standards seriously.  France and Italy, traditionally hostile 
to industry involvement in policymaking, are now calling upon market actors to design 
and enforce more tailored privacy safeguards and Germany and Britain, where such self-
regulation has always been common, are continuing to promote new self-regulatory 
techniques.  This pattern of convergence has been driven by the regulatory realities of the 
new digital marketplace, as well as the credible commitments logic and the diffusion 
process triggered by Europeanization.  Based on a review of three other policy areas, I 
suggest that this convergence phenomenon extends beyond the privacy case and is 
emerging throughout European regulatory governance.   
 
Looking beyond European governance, these findings have implications for the 
study of convergence and transplants in comparative law more broadly.  The American 
legal system is a highly salient model and it is generally regarded as a major source of 
legal export to the rest of the world, either because export is seen to be in the interests of 
the global hegemon or because, for various reasons, the American legal system is 
considered more advanced than others and therefore is thought to be the model towards 
which other countries will gravitate.  However, as this study has shown, before 
concluding that foreign legal systems are being Americanized it is important to examine 
carefully the legal instruments that appear to be introducing American innovations and to 
gather data on how the law is being used on the ground.  This empirical work is equally 
or more likely to find institutional resistance to change as it is to find Americanization.  
Theoretically, this resistance to change is a manifestation of the interconnected system of 
legal rules, judicial decisions, academic scholarship, and legal education that constitutes 
any legal order and that tends to insulate the legal establishment from dramatic 
transformation.  The challenge for comparative research, therefore, is not simply to seek 
out American influence, but to understand the conditions under which domestic legal 
systems will accept or reject foreign legal innovation. 
 
The second pitfall of the salience of the American model is that it can obscure 
other sources of legal transplants and convergence.  In this study, northern legal systems 
and their self-regulatory legal instruments served as an important source of inspiration for 
southern European systems.  Transplants at the regional level are likely to be extremely 
common, given the cultural and linguistic affinities that making legal borrowing 
attractive, and the extensive political and economic ties that bind together government 46 
 
officials and lawyers within regions.  Although the European Union is an extreme case of 
regional integration, other examples exist in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, and the 
dynamics of policy diffusion and legal borrowing in these regional settings deserve to be 
studied in their own right.  The spread of American law through global markets and 
international organizations is certainly an important phenomenon, but it should be 
understood as one of a number of diffusion processes that intersects and combines with 
other, equally powerful, sources of domestic legal change. 
 
 47 
 
Appendix:  Note on Litigation Data 
 
Two types of litigation were relevant to understanding the role of the courts in data privacy 
regulation:  administrative law challenges to the decisions of national privacy agencies and tort 
suits brought against privacy violators under national data privacy laws.   Below, I give the 
sources and methods that I used to collect data on each type of litigation. 
 
Legal challenges to agency decisions 
 
Britain:  Annual reports 
 
Italy:  No source available. 
 
Germany:  No source available.  
 
France:  Lamyline database containing Council of State decisions since 1964.  The Council of 
State has exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to CNIL decisions and therefore it was 
unnecessary to examine the decisions of the lower administrative courts. The case counts exclude 
cases involving disputes over access to police and national security files (indirect access cases) 
since the rule for allocating agency responsibility and court jurisdiction over these cases 
switched during the time period of interest and therefore the numbers before and after the rule 
change would not be comparable.   
 
Statutory tort litigation 
 
Research on tort litigation in Europe is handicapped by the lack of comprehensive reporting 
systems similar to the coverage of American courts that can be found in electronic databases like 
Westlaw and Lexis.  However, in all four country cases, there is complete reporting of decisions 
rendered by the highest courts, and since litigants have an appeal of right to courts of last resort 
in the civil law systems of Italy, Germany, and France, the volume of cases decided by these 
courts is considerable.  Moreover, for Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom, I was able to 
obtain access to electronic databases with fairly good coverage of lower court decisions.  
 
In all country cases, the initial searches were as broad as possible, based on the official title of 
the national law.  Individual decisions were then excluded from the pool if it appeared from the 
text of the decision that the data privacy law did not serve as grounds for the lawsuit originally 
brought by the plaintiff in the court of first instance.  These mainly included cases in which the 
data privacy law was used as a defense, e.g., paternity suits seeking to obtain blood samples from 
alleged fathers, discovery orders, etc.  Judicial decisions were also excluded from the data set if 
the data privacy law was referred to in passing but was tangential to the case and did not serve as 
grounds for the decision.  Because case reports are so heavily edited in civil law countries, few 
cases were excluded on this basis in the French, Italian, and German searches.  However, 
because judicial opinions are reported in full in common law systems, more hits were excluded 
on this basis from the British pool of cases.  
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The electronic databases used were as follows: 
 
Great Britain:  Westlaw, section “UK-RPTS-ALL” 
 
France:  LamyLine, “Jurisprudence de droit privé”;  Dalloz.fr, “Jurisprudences” 
 
Germany:  Beck Online; Carl Heymanns Verlag, sections on BGHZ and BGHSt 
 
Italy:  Repertorio Foro Italiano,  “Giurisprudenza”; Lex24 & Repertorio24; LexItalia.it 
 
  
 